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Executive Summary 
 
We face a problem of anthropogenic climate change, but the Kyoto Protocol 
of 1997 has failed to tackle it. A child of summits, it was doomed from the 
beginning, because of the way that it came into being, Kyoto has given only 
an illusion of action. It has become the sole focus of our efforts, and, as a 
result, we have wasted fifteen years.  
 
We have called this essay “The Wrong Trousers” evoking the Oscar-winning 
animated film of that name. In that film, the hapless hero, Wallace, 
becomes trapped in a pair of automated ‘Techno Trousers’. Whereas he 
thought they would make his life easier, in fact, they take control and carry 
him off in directions he does not wish to go.  
 
We evoke this image to suggest how the Kyoto Protocol has also marched us 
involuntarily to unintended and unwelcome places. Just as the enticingly 
electro-mechanical “Techno Trousers” offered the prospect of hugely 
increasing the wearer’s power and stride, so successful international 
treaties leverage the power of signatory states in a similar way, making 
possible together what cannot be achieved alone. The Kyoto Wrong Trousers 
have done something similar to those who fashioned and subscribed to the 
agreement. To set a new course, we need to understand how we have gone 
wrong so far. Accordingly, the essay proceeds in three sections, as follows: 
  
I. Kyoto: From Treaty to Creed 
 
Recognition is growing of the many and serious shortcomings of the Kyoto 
Protocol and these are explained in this section. Some are technical; but 
others come because Kyoto has become a surrogate for other fights, as well 
as a dogma. Before the next meeting in Bali, Indonesia, locks down the post-
2012 phase of climate change policy, there is a slim window of opportunity 
to implement a more productive approach.  
 
II. Why Did the Kyoto Protocol Fail? 
 
The Kyoto Protocol was doomed from the beginning because it was modelled 
on plausible but inappropriate precedents. We explain the failure of the 
Kyoto Protocol and discover what we can learn from its history in order to 
better design future policy. 
 
We can discard the usual reasons given for the failure of the Kyoto protocol: 
that there is no problem of climate change; that certain key states have not 
signed up; or that political will was lacking. As the IPCC shows, there is a 
problem. Certain states, notably the USA and Australia, may have refused to 
sign up, but Kyoto has failed even in Europe and Japan, both of which 
enthusiastically adopted it and have paid huge sums to meet targets via 
“carbon offset” credits. There is plenty of political will, but it is driving a 
defective political process.  
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The Kyoto Protocol failed because it is the wrong type of instrument (a 
universal intergovernmental treaty) relying too heavily on the wrong agents 
exercising the wrong sort of power to create, from the top down, a carbon 
market. It relies on establishing a global market by government fiat, which 
has never been done successfully for any commodity. Such fabricated 
markets invite sharp and corrupt practices–and these are now occurring on a 
large scale in the European Emissions Trading Scheme and through Kyoto 
Clean Development Mechanism scams such as HFC combustion. This 
accounts for two-thirds of all CDM payments to 2012. On false premises, it 
dodged increasing challenges that result from industrialisation in China and 
India, in particular the growing use of coal in both countries. 
 
Kyoto was constructed by quick borrowing from past practice with other 
treaty regimes dealing with ozone, sulphur emissions and nuclear bombs 
which, while superficially plausible, are not applicable in the ways that the 
drafters assumed because these were “tame” problems (complicated, but 
with defined and achievable end-states), whereas climate change is 
“wicked” (comprising open, complex and imperfectly understood systems). 
Technical knowledge was taken as sufficient basis from which to derive 
Kyoto’s policy, whereas “wicked” problems demand profound understanding 
of their integration in social systems, and their ongoing development. 
 
The presentation of Kyoto as the only course of action has raised the 
political price of admitting its defects, not least because it would mean 
admitting that the non-signatories may have been right in practice, 
whatever their motives. Its advocates invested emotional as well as political 
capital in the process, making it difficult to contemplate the idea that it is 
fatally flawed. Its narrow focus on mitigating the emission of greenhouse 
gases (in which it has failed) has created a taboo on discussing other 
approaches, in particular, adaptation to climate change. Failure to adapt 
will cost the poor and vulnerable the most. 
 
For the past fifteen years, it has given the concerned public an illusion of 
effective action, tranquillising political concern. This has been, perhaps, its 
most damaging legacy. 
 
III. The Right Trousers 
 
The final section sets down the principles that should underpin a viable 
engagement with climate security. In it, we take a radically different 
approach from the top-down command and regulatory regime of output 
targets that is Kyoto. Our approach is both older and simpler. It sets out to 
harness enlightened self-interest to drive a process designed to generate a 
range of possible solutions, which can be compared and assessed, mixed and 
matched, changed and refined as we pursue the goal of climate security.  
 
In this essay, the reader will not find a detailed critique of the Kyoto 
mechanisms. Nor will the reader find a proposal for a different single 
solution in place of Kyoto. We have refrained from this because climate 
change is not a discrete problem amenable to any single shot solution, be it 
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Kyoto or any other. Climate change is the result of a particular development 
path and its globally interlaced supply system of fossil energy. No single 
intervention can change such a complex nexus (although as the earlier 
sections have shown, the attempt to do so has produced unintended and 
unwelcome effects). There is no simple silver bullet.  
 
Instead, we suggest that in cases like this, the best line of attack is not 
head-on. We suggest that the policy response to climate change should 
assemble instead a portfolio of approaches—silver buckshot, rather than 
silver bullet—that would move us in the right direction, even though it is 
impossible to predict which of these approaches might stimulate the 
necessary fundamental change. This is a process of social learning in which 
we must be always alert to maintain our trajectory towards the goal by 
constant course corrections and improvements which, by definition, cannot 
be prescribed precisely beforehand. 
 
In the third section we elaborate the following seven basic principles of such 
a radically re-thought approach: 1. Use silver buckshot; 2. Abandon 
universalism; 3. Devise trading schemes from the bottom up; 4. Deal with 
problems at the lowest possible levels of decision-making; 5. Invest in 
technology R&D; 6. Increase spending on adaptation; 7. Understand that 
successful climate policy does not necessarily focus instrumentally on the 
climate. 
 
Throughout we emphasise the urgency of re-framing climate policy in this 
way because whereas today there is strong public support for climate 
action, continued policy failure on the Kyoto principles spun as a story of 
success could lead to public withdrawal of trust and consent for action, 
whatever form it takes. 
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I. Kyoto: From Treaty to Creed 
 
A Window of Opportunity 
 
The Kyoto Protocol regime expires in 2012. In December 2007, on the 
Indonesian island of Bali, the next phase of climate change policy will be 
locked up. This gives us a slender window of opportunity to radically rethink 
our objectives and operations.  
 
The many and serious shortcomings of the protocol’s regime are at last 
beginning to be publicly recognised, and new approaches are being 
discussed. But new approaches will be structurally compromised from the 
outset if they repeat past mistakes—and, as things are going now, that is all 
too likely. 
  
The conventional wisdom currently framing the opening assumptions for the 
Indonesian Summit holds that the successor to Kyoto must somehow be 
much more stringent and more inclusive. The view is held that the USA, 
China and India must certainly be drawn into a UN mediated process.  
 
With these thoughts in mind, the “20/20” target, agreed by the European 
Union at its March 2007 environment summit, is ambitious. It invites a 20% 
reduction in CO2 emissions by 2020—much applauded by European politicians 
at that summit as a sign of serious intent. Indeed, the Commission wanted 
the 20% cut to be achieved through existing methods, without need for new 
agreements. A fresh global agreement, the Commission believed, should aim 
to be more demanding still: 30% by 2020. The British Government intends to 
legislate a national Climate Change Act premised upon a 60% cut by 2050. As 
will become evident, we have no more idea how the British Government 
thinks it can achieve this target than how the EU can attain its lesser target. 
 
From Alarm to Euphoria 
 
The economist Antony Downs has identified an issue/attention cycle that 
comprises five stages: pre-publicity; alarmed discovery; euphoric reaction; 
counting the cost; and quiescence.1 In the cycle of the politics of the 
environment, we are moving once more from alarmed discovery to euphoric 
reaction. 
 
This is at least the second trip round the “Downs’ Cycle” for the problem of 
global climate change. The first began in the late 1980s. We can sum up 
political attitudes before this with a personal anecdote. In 1986, a senior 
American official rejected the proposal for a research programme on the 
policy implications of climate change on the grounds that it would never 
become a major public concern. This was, apparently, because it lacked the 
three essential prerequisites: “It is too far in the future. The science is too 
 
1 A. Downs, “Up and Down with Ecology: The ‘Issue Attention Cycle’”, The Public Interest, 
28 (1972) 38-50. 
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uncertain. And there is no readily identifiable villain upon which to focus 
the blame.”2
 
The first phase of Downs’ Cycle, pre-publicity, began with the 1988 drought 
and heat wave in North America. This provided a vivid background for the 
report of the first IPCC Working Group on the Science of the Climate (WGI)3, 
chaired by John Houghton, to the UN’s Rio summit on environment and 
development, usually called the “Earth Summit”. The influence of 
Houghton’s WGI report at the summit was widely attributed to the careful 
and scientifically responsible division of the report into “things certain”, 
“things probable” and “things possible”.4 But, however deft or persuasive 
any report may be, timing is the essential pivot in politics. With the collapse 
of the USSR and the ending of the Cold War, the moment was ripe for 
another crusade.  
 
The second phase in this first trip around Downs’ Cycle, “alarmed 
discovery”, followed at the Rio Earth Summit of 1992. The “euphoric 
reaction” was the political shaping and negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol of 
1997. Even so, as we will explore in more detail, doubts were being voiced 
from the outset. In the later 1990s, some business people, as well as the 
non-signatory states, were questioning the costs involved. The phase of 
“quiescence” came at the turn of the century. This was partly because 
constituencies concerned with climate change in the West were focused on 
other problems, such as African poverty reduction, development aid 
advocacy and nuclear disarmament.  
 
But in 2006-7, climate change rocketed to the top of the international 
political agenda with a velocity that demands explanation. We can point to 
the coverage given to the ineptitude of the Bush Administration’s response 
to the flooding of New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina, and the sense of 
political momentum among activists was reinforced by Al Gore’s visually 
compelling and widely screened advocacy film, An Inconvenient Truth. 
Significant milestones on the way include: i) the California Global Warming 
Solutions Act (August, 2006), which sets the goal of stabilising the world’s 
fifth largest economy at its 2000 CO2 emissions by 2010 (this pioneers 
investment guarantees to encourage private investors into “blue skies” de-
carbonised energy research; ii) the Stern Report5 (November, 2006), which 
suggested that the costs of inaction would exceed those of action in the 
medium term; and iii) the publication of the Summary for Policymakers of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth Assessment 
Report (March, 2007).  
 
 
2 S. Rayner, “What Drives Environmental Policy?”, (Editorial) Global Environmental Change, 
16 (2006) 4. 
3 J. T. Houghton, G. J. Jenkins, and J. J. Ephraums, (eds.) Climate Change: The IPCC 
Scientific Assessment, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990). 
4 WMO/UNEP, Climate Change: The IPCC 1990 and 1992 Assessments, (IPCC, 1992) 52-3. 
5 N. Stern, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review, (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2007). 
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Concern has now culminated in a consensus view, based in and originally 
emanating from Europe, and now uncontested by major western news 
media, which holds that the science debate about climate change is over. It 
demands that radical, far-reaching, deeply penetrating forms of directive 
policy and governmental action are now required to follow from the Kyoto 
Protocol, after it expires in 2012.  
 
Yet, it is a fact that, if the formal aim was to reduce the worldwide 
emission—or even the increase in rate of emission—of anthropogenic CO2, 
then Kyoto turned out to be the Wrong Trousers in the sense that gullible 
Wallace discovered and his wise but silent dog Gromit feared, in the 
eponymous film. Wallace’s Wrong Trousers were enticingly electro-
mechanical and seductively modern. They offered the promise of greatly 
increasing the wearer’s power and stride (or in Wallace and Gromit’s case, 
making dog-walking easier). But when they were switched on, their 
undoubted power actually produced quite unexpected and unwelcome 
results. If the aim was to effect real material change in human impact upon 
the atmosphere, then Kyoto might have achieved three things: to make any 
meaningful practical progress at all towards mitigation of anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emissions; to begin effective adaptation to climate change, 
which is the quickest way to protect people now living from adverse 
impacts; to challenge the refusal of climate puritans to entertain the idea of 
adaptation alongside their narrow preoccupation with mitigating emissions.  
 
The fact is, Kyoto has achieved none of these things. In the case of 
adaptation, it may be that activists feared that the presentation of such an 
alternative would dilute the political will to follow their prescription: in 
fact, Al Gore described adaptation in millenarian language as “…a kind of 
laziness, an arrogant faith in our ability to react in time to save our skins.”6 
Whatever the cause, until very recently, adaptation was kept off the table, 
and some continue to resist it.  
 
Relentless Rhetoric and Awkward Spaces 
 
And so, the EU, and Great Britain, are continuing to set ambitious targets 
for reductions in CO2 emissions, and presenting them to the public with 
resolute vigour. But look more closely and the discovery of mixed motives is 
hardly surprising. Politicians hope that some of the green lustre may rub off 
onto themselves and their other projects. In 2006, the then Environment 
Minister (now the British Foreign Secretary) almost said as much. Warming 
to his repeated theme that the EU should be seen as an “Environment 
Union”, he argued: “Europe needs a new raison d’être….The needs of the 
environment are coming together with the needs of the EU: one is a cause 
looking for a champion; the other a champion in search of a cause.”7 
Meanwhile, the British Opposition leader has swapped the previous 
 
6 A. Gore, Earth in the Balance: Ecology and the Human Spirit, (Houghton Mifflin, New 
York, 1992) 240. 
7 D. Miliband, “Towards an Environmental Union”, Centre for European Reform Bulletin, 
50, (October/November 2006). 
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Conservative logo for an oak tree—another green reference? And yet, behind 
this rhetoric and these gestures, the mixture of agents and mechanisms 
proposed to achieve the targets set is not greatly changed from the original 
Kyoto conception. As its first order task, it still seeks to reduce 
anthropogenic carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions.8  
 
The politically charged rhetoric within which the climate change question is 
discussed means that anyone who questions the levels of the percentage 
reduction goals, or expresses doubt about their feasibility or the structures 
and methods offered to achieve them is regarded with suspicion. 
Unquestioning support for massive and immediate reductions of emissions 
under the Kyoto type of approach has become a litmus test for determining 
who takes the threat of climate change seriously. In a new Manichaean 
Heresy, individuals, institutions and nations who promote Kyoto are blessed. 
But those who doubt it, for whatever reason, are damned and lumped 
together as heretics.9  
 
Both in moral as well as in operational terms, Kyoto is predicated upon 
changing the world first in order to meet its goals, rather than taking the 
world as it is and seeking ways to build on possibilities and dynamics already 
present. This is a profound philosophical difference of approach between 
the Kyoto supporters and the one that we advocate in Part Three of this 
essay. 
 
As we will discuss, the consequences of turning treaty into creed have 
obstructed effective action on anthropogenic aspects of climate change, 
stifling questions and sedating political demands. Failures and defects are 
excused or ignored in such ways that any lessons they might carry cannot be 
learned, questions cannot even be raised. Instead, relentless optimism is 
the order of the day. For example, we have been told by a senior European 
Commission official involved in “20/20”, that he has in fact confronted his 
colleagues in private: observing that 2020 is only five thousand days from 
now, and that the record of the last five years has been of a 3.4% net 
increase in global CO2 emissions. He asked them, what on earth would turn 
that past track record into their future target? The first phase of the 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) has crashed and 
burned.10 So, he suggested, the satisfaction expressed by high EU officials at 
simply having agreed a target number is badly misplaced, and some better 
 
8 EU Commission Communication “Limiting Global Climate Change to 2° Celsius: The Way 
Ahead for 2020 and Beyond”, (10 January 2007); adopted by EU Heads of State at spring 
summit, 8-9 March 2007.
9 For example, see R. Collier, “Why Get So Heated About Global Warming?” a review of 
Break Through: From the Death of Environmentalism to the Politics of Possibility, by Ted 
Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger, and Cool It: The Skeptical Environmentalist's Guide to 
Global Warming, by Bjørn Lomborg, San Francisco Chronicle, (7 October 2007). 
10 The anonymous EU official is supported in that opinion by the House of Commons 
Environmental Audit Committee (in Second Report “The EU Emissions Trading Scheme: 
Lessons for the Future” (HC Paper (2006-7) no. 70, 1 March 2007), which concluded that the 
first phase of EU ETS could not be shown to have produced any real-world reduction in CO2 
at all. 
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way of acting will be required. But what that might be is not yet apparent 
to him. As things stand, whatever follows will remain an inter-governmental 
negotiated instrument, generating a regime of targets projected through 
international agencies like the UN.  
 
The elevation of the Kyoto Protocol to the status of a litmus test for 
humanitarian and environmental responsibility has created an awkward 
space. As Rayner has pointed out in evidence to a House of Commons 
Committee in 2004, “…between Kyoto’s supporters and those who scoff at 
the dangers of leaving greenhouse gas emissions unchecked, there has been 
a tiny minority of commentators and analysts convinced of the urgency of 
the problem while remaining profoundly sceptical of the proposed solution. 
Their voices have gone largely unheard.”11 We belong to that small group 
standing in that awkward space; and this essay seeks to help correct that 
imbalance. 
 
The Emperor Has No Clothes 
 
It is not scepticism, but the strength of our concern about human-induced 
climatic perturbation that compels us to expose these uncomfortable 
arguments. There is a serious climate change problem to address—and we 
have been aware of this for a long time. Not only have the basic physics of 
the greenhouse effect been understood for more than a century, since 
Arrhenius first described it, 12 so has the general magnitude of the effect. 
The role of human agency within the global climate system has been 
progressively refined since then. Leading voices in the scientific community 
agree that the climate will continue to change due to human influences, 
among others, and such changes include the possibility of the abrupt and 
disruptive.13  
 
We have to act effectively, but there are no good reasons to think that 
instruments like Phase II of the EU ETS, the British Climate Bill, or the Kyoto 
successor will be successful in their formal aims. Across the world, targets 
bear little relation to reality. Democratic victories in the 2006 US 
Congressional elections were swiftly followed by an odd “auction of 
promises” in which members of Congress vied to outbid each other with 
proposed emissions targets that were simply not achievable. In Britain, early 
2007 found the Environment Secretary announcing his enthusiasm for 
personal carbon allowances. Not only is there scant evidence for the 
 
11 S. Rayner, “The International Challenge of Climate Change: UK Leadership in the G8 and 
EU”, Memorandum to the House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, (24 
November 2004) 5. 
12 S. Arrhenius, “On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air upon the Temperature on the 
Ground”, The London, Edinburgh & Dublin Philosophical Magazine & Journal of Science 
(fifth series), 41 (1896) 237-75; IPCC Working Group 1 (Physical science basis), Fourth 
Assessment Report (June 2007). 
13  As a statement of principles, we think that the summary statement that prefaces the 
first IPCC scientific assessment is exemplary, and continues to be a prudent guide. See J. T. 
Houghton, G. J. Jenkins & J. J. Ephraums, Climate Change: the IPCC Scientific Assessment, 
(above, n. 6), xxvii. 
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efficacy of this approach, but this is a policy which, viewed cynically, may 
reflect a desire to off-load onto individuals, under an inappropriate guise of 
“choice”, the responsibility for awkward decisions. It is an easy step from 
there to blaming individuals for future failures. Whether or not this is the 
case, it is certainly a necessarily intrusive policy with ramifications that 
should trouble anyone concerned about privacy and civil liberty. It has been 
followed by an escalating competition between the three main British 
political parties over which could propose the most stringent curbs on 
carbon emission. No other options have been discussed. 
 
In Britain, this policy debate is being conducted alongside other 
governmental priorities that have a quite different focus. The government is 
raising the marginal costs of train travel, making plans to expand airports, 
widen motorways, build roads, and build large numbers of new houses in 
flood-plains. This reveals how the uncompromising framing of the climate 
change issue and its potential solution in the Kyoto formulation, was always 
destined to be in jarring contradiction with the trajectories of most other 
governmental initiatives in democratic politics. Perhaps this explains why 
responsibility for change is now being off-loaded onto individuals (e.g., “We 
build the airport/road etc, we tax you not to use it but you do anyway, so 
we did our best and it’s your fault”).14
 
Solutions for the Future 
 
Both writers of this essay began to be engaged with the issue of climate 
change in the mid-1980s when the task was to gain any audience at all for 
the discussion. In 1990, we each, independently, argued that the evidence 
for some kind of policy action on climate was at least as strong, if not 
stronger, than the evidence upon which governments, firms, and 
communities routinely rely to make economic or foreign policy, make 
takeover bids or investments in new products, or manage local 
infrastructure and resources respectively.15 Today, we find that we are like 
coachmen on a runaway stage-coach, trying to rein back bolting horses, 
crying “Whoa! Whoa!” before an accident happens.  
 
The idea that the Kyoto Protocol approach to climate change mitigation is 
the only solution compounds the problem of finding viable responses for real 
problems. Another solution must be found—or rather other solutions.  
 
14 Opinion polls reveal that these same contrasts (between public and individual 
responsibility) in policy are also found in public attitudes: while huge majorities believe 
that global warming is occurring (85%) and will continue (79%), and a considerable number 
(48%) think their children’s lives will be worse as a consequence, a substantial majority 
(65%) nevertheless oppose raising fuel duty and only a quarter would be prepared to fly 
less, http://www.yougov.com/archives/pdf /TEL060101021_1.pdf (accessed October 2006). 
15 G. Prins, “Politics and the Environment”, International Affairs, 66/4, (1990) 711-730;  
W. Fulkerson, R. Cushman, G. Marland, S. Rayner, International Impacts of Global Climate 
Change: Testimony to House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and 
Related Programs (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, ORNL/TM-11184, 1989); S. Rayner, 
“Human Choice and Climatic Change: Managing the Global Environment”, Global 
Environmental Lecture Series, Cornell Law School (27 March 1989). 
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This is not a delaying tactic. On the contrary, it is because of the waste of 
time and opportunity over the last fifteen years that a switch to climate 
policy based on different principles is urgently needed.  
 
Among these solutions we include adaptation—and we will suggest below 
that current hostility to adaptation is predicated upon a misunderstanding 
of the operation of the greenhouse effect. Far from impeding progress on 
mitigation, under a different philosophy of climate policy, early adaptation 
efforts could have had exactly the opposite effect.16 In fact, had that 
different philosophy been adopted instead of the Kyoto approach, wartime 
levels of targeted and accountable public and private investment in the 
energy production and use cycle, for example, might have already begun.  
 
In the rest of this paper, we address two tasks. The first is to establish the 
reasons for the failure of the Kyoto Protocol, and discover what we can 
learn from the history of this failure in order better to design future policy. 
The second is to describe the principles that should drive a process designed 
to generate a range of possible solutions, which can then be compared and 
assessed, mixed and matched to the task in hand.  
 
At the moment when the issue is again to the fore and not yet quite locked 
into the form of its next iteration, it is vital to understand why Kyoto was 
The Wrong Trousers as an essential preparative to radically rethinking 
climate policy. We insist on recognising the failure of Kyoto not because of a 
desire to stand in judgement, but because, without this frank recognition, 
the climate policy community will continue to demand more of the same as 
the remedy to present setbacks, as witnessed in the published draft agenda 
for the Bali Conference.  
 
 
16 S. Rayner & E. L. Malone, “Ten Suggestions for Policymakers”, in S. Rayner & E. L. Malone 
(eds.) Human Choice and Climate Change, Vol. 4, What Have We Learned (Battelle Press, 
Columbus, Ohio, 1998). 
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II. Why Did the Kyoto Protocol Fail? 
 
The Wrong Framing 
 
The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 was an important symbolic expression of public 
anxiety about possible human impacts on the natural world; but it was 
fundamentally flawed as an instrumental arrangement for dealing with 
climate change. In short, it was doomed from birth. 
 
The shortcomings in the Kyoto mechanism were privately acknowledged 
from very early on, and aired among the expert and professionally engaged 
community soon thereafter.17 Only very recently have these concerns 
surfaced in wider public awareness. But although admitted obliquely in, for 
example, the 2004 Annan High Level Panel report on reform of the UN 
(“…We urge member states to reflect on the gap between the promise of 
the Kyoto protocol and its performance…”)18, it is still not universally 
admitted to the public, especially in Europe, that Kyoto has failed in its own 
terms. Instead, it has been turned into a morality play, with castigation of 
non-signatories, who now receive the blame for any failures. 
 
As the issue has recently risen steeply in political salience, the presentation 
of the issue has become permeated with a sort of moral panic and 
associated hyperbole. It has become dogma that climate change is now the 
greatest challenge facing humanity, and that we have only a very short time 
in which to save the planet.19 The Kyoto Protocol is a manifestation of a 
particular framing of the climate change issue. In this section of the paper, 
we are not principally concerned with the detailed substance of the 
Protocol or its affines, like the EU ETS, but with the three sets of 
assumptions—about command and control, targets and transfers, and the 
right treaty models to adopt—that lie beneath and within its framing.  
 
i) Command and Control  
 
The Kyoto Protocol seeks to square a circle. It seeks to articulate a market-
driven trading mechanism, with a top-down detailed specification of how it 
will work. Although it attempts to go beyond classic command and control 
approaches, in the last resort it still rests on the pre-eminence of those 
planning tools. It is an example of a form of output target-setting that seeks 
to prevail by institutional fiat, based on over-confident assertion of fragile 
 
17 D. Victor, The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and the Struggle to Slow Global Warming, 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2001); R. Benedick, “Striking a New Deal on Climate 
Change”, Issues in Science and Technology, 18/11 (2001) 71-76; F. Laird, “Just Say No to 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions”, Issues in Science and Technology, 17/2 (2000) 45-52;  
D. Sarewitz and R. A. Pielke, Jr., “Breaking the Global Warming Gridlock”, The Atlantic 
Monthly, 286/1 (2000) 55-64. 
18 United Nations, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Report of the Secretary 
General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, UN (2004) 30. 
19 For example: “The entire scientific community is telling the world that it's the biggest 
threat to human civilisation.” Mark Lynas, quoted by M. McCarthy, “Global Warming: Too 
Hot to Handle for the BBC”, The Independent, (6 September 2007).                     
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knowledge, through the sanction of tax and associated punishment. It has 
been applied to an entirely novel, indeed, a fabricated market.  
 
The emissions targets set by Kyoto were only distantly related to mitigating 
the causes of climate change, and not at all to adapting to its effects. They 
were also far too low. Even so, they were further watered down in 
intergovernmental negotiation that was attempting to gain signatories, 
notably at The Hague COP-6 review conference in 2000. As Richard Cooper 
spelt out immediately after Kyoto was negotiated and opened for 
subscription, the two essentials of any successful agreement were always 
missing: there was no common agreement on means or on objectives.20 
Goals are related to, but are different from, targets. Kyoto has been shaped 
around output targets. Input targets such as a renewable energy 
commitment, are a different matter and fit well with the approach that we 
advocate below. But the widespread opinion that no political progress is 
possible without the vision of output targets to drive them is widely 
disproved by experience, including, but not exclusive to, the failure of 
central planning in the now vanishing communist world. 
 
The top-down creation of a market in emissions was an integral part of the 
Kyoto approach. But it has hardly been successful. In fact, the boom and 
bust career of carbon trading so far and especially of the carbon offset 
business within it, has manic and fantastical qualities reminiscent of the 
South Sea Bubble of 1720, or the Dutch tulip investment mania of the 
seventeenth century.  
 
The relation of state power to climate policy has paradoxical qualities. 
Modern states are of course uniquely powerful. They usually have the 
monopoly of legitimate violence; they always have bureaucratic power, and 
sometimes have elements of both of the other Weberian ideal types of 
traditional and charismatic power as well.21 Their power mesmerises, 
especially those who exercise power within them. So it seems only common 
sense, especially to such practitioners of power when confronted with an 
immense problem, to reach reflexively for such levers. But state power in 
all its grandeur has little leverage here. It is simply not the right agent in 
this case. It has little purchase upon the process of CO2 emission, and such 
as it has is inappropriate in its effect. 
 
After the collapse of communism in most of the world, the state and inter-
governmental associations of states cannot claim control of the means of 
production of CO2, only privileged guardianship of the process and of 
measurements, translated into regulations. This is a “top down” command 
approach, which is perhaps why the Kyoto mechanism is so entwined with 
metrics and targets. In fact, an efficient grip on carbon emission must 
necessarily mesh with real material processes, and arise from the “bottom 
 
20 R. Cooper, “Toward a Real Global Warming Treaty”, Foreign Affairs, 77/2 (March/April 
1998) 66-79. 
21 M. Weber, Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. by A. R. Anderson and T. 
Parsons, (1966 [1947] Free Press). 
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up”. That is done by different agents with different powers and different 
decision processes that mostly reside in and are mediated by market forces.  
 
Very little of the money now flowing through the highly constrained Kyoto 
credit carbon offset market has gone to new non-carbon technologies and 
very few of those offset credits will benefit the world’s poor, as we 
document below.  
 
The Kyoto Protocol called for states to behave as they scarcely ever do. It 
called for them to exercise self-restraint for altruistic motives. Since it goes 
against the grain of their natures, while it may appear noble and 
courageous, that course is rarely a wise—or pursued—course in diplomacy. 
Adam Smith’s advice in The Wealth of Nations (1776) is to be heeded here: 
“We address ourselves not to their humanity but to their self-love and never 
talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages”. Ordering 
people what to do is rarely as successful a strategy as one that they 
undertake willingly. Moreover, willing actions possess commensurately 
higher degrees of political—and moral22—legitimacy precisely because of the 
absence of coercion.  
 
Rather than the current top-down, command and control approach, the 
engagement with climate change should capitalise in novel ways upon the 
only driver of voluntary political action that has demonstrated reliability, 
namely self-propelled, enlightened self interest. As it is, within the framing 
of the Kyoto Protocol, states have simply pursued raison d’état, as they 
almost always do.  
 
ii) Targets and Transfers 
 
Deft self-interested diplomacy in the mid-1990s by Russia, Ukraine and re-
united Germany set the base-line for measuring their “improvement”, and 
hence their case for transfer funding, at a date before the collapse of their 
highly inefficient and polluting communist-era industries. As David Victor 
documented in 2001, all these states had to do to claim free money for 
selling notional “credits” was what they were doing anyway: demolishing 
communist-era plants and rebuilding their industries and infrastructure as 
they entered the global market economy.23  
 
The market that has developed rewards countries and enterprises with low 
growth by allowing them to sell unused pollution permits, and punishes the 
economically successful by making them buy such permits. Unsurprisingly, 
the USA has not been prepared to give cold cash for “hot air”. But the 
pattern continues: in 2007, Russian hot air is again for sale and this time is 
being bought in volume by Europeans, as they attempt to prop up the 
European Union Emissions Trading System, preventing a repeat of its 2006 
collapse. The scale of offset purchases by Europeans has created rich 
 
22 Discussed by Adam Smith in Section IV, “Practical rules of morality”, of The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments (Harvard University Press, Boston, 1853). 
23 Victor, The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol. 
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pickings not only for Gazprom, but also for entrepreneurs and governments, 
notably in Asia, who get money for nothing by selling “surplus” credits.  
 
It is becoming evident that there will be little or no structural change to 
meet CO2 reduction targets in Europe. As a result, it is becoming 
increasingly important for governments to obtain extra-European offset 
credits. The more widespread this strategy becomes, the less incentive 
there is for governments to tackle the structural issues at source, because 
they can always spin a tricky story of compliance along these lines.  
 
As an example, consider what is happening in Germany, a country with a 
large and vociferous green political constituency. The Chancellor is carefully 
polishing her green credentials. What is happening in practice? Germany has 
a large domestic Kyoto credit surplus entitlement as a windfall from the 
destruction of East German industry. It has also negotiated with the 
European Commission an increase in the number of Kyoto credits per year 
that it may buy from elsewhere (from 57.8 million to 90.6 million). Now, 
Germany can meet its emissions target without making any serious 
structural changes at home. Its Kyoto credit surpluses are effectively 
subsidising the continued operation of its lignite-fuelled power stations. 
Even more bizarre, in some nifty arbitrage, Germany is doing this while 
selling its higher value “surplus” domestic credits to the British.24
 
For a second example, we can turn our attention to the UK. The much- 
trumpeted British reduction in CO2 emissions was also not the result of a 
decision to reduce emissions for climate change reasons. It was a by-product 
of a quite different battle. Mrs Thatcher broke the coal unions by destroying 
their industry. The so-called “dash for gas” in power generation which 
followed the large reduction in coal mining was responsible for most of that 
CO2 abatement. It became possible as British North Sea gas came on-stream.  
 
There were therefore quite respectable reasons why the USA, Australia and, 
initially, Russia did not sign the Kyoto Protocol, as well as other motives on 
all sides (including ignoble reasons for Russia’s eventual subscription). 
Furthermore, the regime did not include the rising industrial powers. India 
and China did not join the treaty, claiming the special exemption of the 
need to escape from poverty, alongside lack of responsibility for emissions 
to date—although the carbon emissions of the Indian middle classes can be 
shown already to exceed those of Australia25, while China’s quick and dirty 
industrialisation is well known, generating greenhouse gas emissions that 
now exceed even those of the United States.  
 
 
24 “Europe’s Dirty Secret: Why the EU Emissions Trading Scheme Isn’t Working”, Open 
Europe Research Paper, (August 2007), cited in PointCarbon.com, “Carbon Market Europe”, 
(23 February 2007) 48, (German domestic credit entitlements are given in the table at 37); 
Carbon Trust, “EU ETS Phase II Allocation: Implications and Lessons”, cit. ibid. (May 2007), 
46, details how Germany gives special subsidy to the most polluting power stations. 
25 S. Rayner, “Governance and the Global Commons”, in M. Desai & P. Redfern (eds.), 
Global Governance: Ethics and Economics of the World Order (Pinter, London, 1995) 80. 
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It looks as if there are few incentives for this to change. The 2007 BP 
Statistical Review of World Energy documents how one consequence of the 
rising absolute price of oil and, more significantly, of the exploration 
viability price of difficult oil will be, ironically, to make use of coal much 
more attractive.26 On present trend, the world faces the consequences of a 
massive upsurge of coal use in China and India in coming decades. China 
increased coal consumption by 8.7% in 2006 over 2005, producing 70% of the 
global total of increased use of coal. The Chinese Communist Party’s 
planned level of coal utilisation for 2020 was actually reached last year.27 
Yet it has been Australia, not China or India, which was vilified for not 
signing; and the fact of America staying out of Kyoto has resulted in its 
widespread public demonization. Speaking in Sydney after the General 
Election campaign had begun, Al Gore described Australia and the USA as 
the “Bonnie and Clyde” (i.e., desperate outlaws) of international climate 
policy, and urged Australians to sign Kyoto, thereby forcing the USA to 
follow suit.28 But this sort of talk has also been recently joined by a dawning 
recognition among a few that the “bad guys” might actually have been 
doing the right thing, albeit for the wrong reasons.  
 
The failure of Kyoto in its own terms is most eloquently attested by the 
finding that the (working) Montreal Protocol on CFC reductions may have 
had a larger net physical impact on the greenhouse effect as an incidental 
consequence, than Kyoto would have had if it had been fully implemented.29 
Perhaps even more startling is that the Bush Administration’s “Methane to 
markets” programme, launched before the Kyoto Protocol was activated, 
may have done more to reduce emissions than all of Kyoto.30 This prompts 
the hard question: is there any evidence that through its formal operation 
the Kyoto Protocol has been a brake on the emission of greenhouse gases at 
all? Or, as we have mentioned, has it made the situation even worse, by 
giving the impression that something was indeed being done, and so 
soothing concern and hence political demand? We can add the charge of 
being a political sedative to the finding of technical irrelevance.  
 
26 The exploration viability price is the price at which it makes economic sense for oil 
companies to invest, i.e., the price at which an oil field is profitable. This figure is not 
published and is much more stable than the headline price: it has been around $28/bbl for 
many years, until it rose to current levels in the mid $30s/bbl in the last two years. At this 
price so-called “difficult” oils become viable. For example, the Canadian province of 
Alberta now posts proven reserves in oil shale that exceed the reserves of either Iraq or 
Iran.  Current estimates are that upwards of 1 trillion barrels of “difficult” oil remain to be 
extracted when the EVP is right. 
27 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2007, www.bp.com/statisticalreview; E. Economy, 
“The Great Leap Backward? The Cost of China’s Environmental Crisis”, Foreign Affairs, 
86/5 (September-October) Sept/Oct 2007) 38-60. 
28 P. Goodenough, “Kyoto Takes Centre Stage in Australian Election Campaign”, (November 
2007), CNSNews.com, http://www.crosswalk.com/news/11557996 (accessed 11 November 
2007). 
29 G. J. M. Velders, et al., “The Importance of the Montreal Protocol in Protecting 
Climate”, ProcNatAcadSci, 104/12 (20 March 2007), 4814-4819. 
30 G. Easterbrook, “Red and Green”, The New Republic, (14 February 2005), 
https://ssl.tnr.com/p/docsub.mhtml?i=w050214&s=easterbrook021405 (accessed 4 
November, 2007). 
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iii) Misguided Models 
 
Kyoto was a child of summits; and its successor promises to be so also, 
judging by present expectations.31 The case for summitry is serious and 
weighty. The build-up of expectations around a key event, the presence of 
state leaders, and the pressure of time can work together to produce 
decisive outcomes that would not be achieved by any other means.  
 
The model for most of the post-war period was the Yalta and Potsdam 
summits, which shaped the post-World-War II world. During the Cold War, 
notably during the Reagan presidency, summitry was refined by the 
superpowers as an instrument for achieving nuclear arms control. Moreover, 
it got results; indeed, sometimes it threatened to work too well.32 The 
personal chemistry of Gorbachev and Reagan at the Reykjavik mini-summit 
of 1984 propelled the two leaders beyond most expectations. Gorbachev and 
his team wanted to bounce the arms control process into arms abolition and 
Gorbachev relied on his personal chemistry with Reagan to try to achieve 
this. As a result, they nearly agreed to a regime to abolish nuclear weapons 
altogether, which was not the Western plan at all.33  
 
The classic model of summitry therefore developed with concentric circles 
of experts who supplied the decision-makers at the centre with the 
formulae and positions to negotiate. “Sherpas”—civil servant experts—paved 
the way towards summits and the expert advisers whirled around the vortex 
of power during the event, feeding in their knowledge. Such a model works 
when the knowledge is secure and the problems under discussion are 
“tame” in the technical sense. However, a summit is much less likely to 
produce a predictable, but accelerated agreement, if the subject matter is, 
not tame, but, to use another technical term, “wicked”.  
 
Tame and Wicked Problems 
 
The difference between tame and wicked problems is central to 
understanding why Kyoto has failed.34 It was a process designed from 
components that had worked for tame problems, but which could not work 
when applied to a wicked one.  
 
 
31 The draft agenda for COP-13 and CMP-3 published on 22 August 2007 gives chapter and 
verse for that fear. 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_13/agendas/application/pdf/cmp3_prov_agenda.pdf 
(accessed 3 November 2007) 
32 D. Reynolds, Summits: Six Meetings That Changed the Twentieth Century, (Allan 
Lane/Penguin, 2007). 
33 A case study examination of the Reykjavik climax of this form of summitry may be found 
in G. Prins, “The Role of Superpower Summitry: Recessional”, Political Quarterly, 61 (July-
September 1990) 263-77. 
34 S. Rayner, Wicked Problems: Clumsy Solutions, First Jack Beale Memorial Lecture, 
University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia, 25 July 2006 
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“Wickedness” in a global problem like climate change, has specific 
meanings.35 What makes a problem “wicked” is the impossibility of giving it 
a definitive formulation: the information needed to understand the problem 
is dependent upon one’s idea for solving it. Furthermore, there is no 
stopping rule: we cannot know whether we have a sufficient understanding 
to stop searching for more understanding. There is no end to causal chains 
in interacting open systems of which the climate is the world’s prime 
example. So every wicked problem can be considered as a symptom of 
another problem: the relationships are therefore complex (multi-faceted) in 
contrast to complicated (multiple, but mono-faceted). If there is premature 
foreclosure, we may become prisoners of our own assumptions. 
 
Because of the social implications of this sort of knowledge, technically 
wicked problems inhabit a special analysis/decision loop. The higher the 
perceived public anxiety, the greater the uncertainty; the greater the 
uncertainty, the greater the desire for direct involvement; the greater the 
involvement, the lower the willingness to trust expert decision-making. As 
this loop develops, it is likely that emotional commitments will play a 
greater role in policy decisions than objective knowledge. At this point, 
scientists must be especially wary of the temptation to gain popular 
applause.36  
 
Superpower summitry from the time of the Cold War was the model of 
politics that was adopted for use in the multilateral arena of the United 
Nations. It was applied to a number of discussions for problems (e.g., of 
development, or racism) that reached far beyond, the “tame world” of 
states and arms-control. These included the Earth Summit, held at Rio in 
1992, which was in many ways the most important of this series.  
 
The Earth Summit was large, both in scope and expectations. Political 
leaders were under great media pressure to deliver results (as happens in 
summits by their very nature), and the civil service that supported them was 
under pressure to offer mechanisms that would lead to those results. What 
happened in that pressure cooker? The civil servants did what common sense 
and human nature suggest. Under pressure, we frequently analyse new 
experiences by analogy and that is neither lazy nor foolish in many 
circumstances. In short, the experts at Rio sought to bring their past 
experience to bear. But sometimes—and the climate change issue is one 
such—experience can carry fatal baggage. 
 
 
35 First defined in these terms in H. Rittel & M. Webber, “Dilemmas in the General Theory 
of Planning”, Policy Sciences, 4 (1973) 154-59. 
36 The manner in which an apparently pure science (“linear”) framing of a science problem 
can actually lead to covert political advocacy is illustrated and discussed in R. Pielke Jr, 
The Honest Broker: Making Sense of Science in Policy & Politics, (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2007) 80-87 & 125-34. 
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Three Key Analogies 
 
With hindsight, and a forensic eye, the design of the climate change regime 
during those years of alarmed discovery and euphoric reaction may be seen 
to bear the marks of conscious and unconscious influences from three major 
policy initiatives of the 1980s. While the influence of the first two of these 
is known to have informed the design of the climate regime, the influence 
of the last is less well or widely recognised. They are the international 
stratospheric ozone regime, which responded to the discovery that 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs were damaging the capacity of the upper 
atmosphere to filter harmful ultraviolet radiation; the US EPA Acid Rain 
Programme, which allowed American electricity generators to trade SO2 
emissions rights; and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), designed 
to reduce the number of nuclear warheads deployed by the Cold War 
superpowers, the USA and the USSR.  
 
The three regimes had features that prima facie seemed to parallel the 
climate change issue, so it is hardly surprising that they helped to frame 
policy makers’ thinking about the problem. But because the problems 
presented by climate change are wicked problems, there were many ways in 
which these models did not fit at all.  
 
i) The International Stratospheric Ozone Regime 
 
The stratospheric ozone regime was developed because of scientific 
concerns about damage to the earth’s protective ozone layer from CFCs 
used in a wide variety of mundane applications, including aerosol cans, 
refrigeration and air conditioning equipment.37 The most obvious parallel 
between the challenge of ozone depletion and that of climate change is that 
both result from the emission of gases resulting from ubiquitous human 
activity. 
 
The ozone regime was established, under UN auspices, through a framework 
convention, agreed in Vienna in 1985, and a subsequent protocol for 
implementation was opened for signature at Montreal in 1987. The Montreal 
Protocol established targets and a timetable for limiting the production of 
the offending gases and paved the way for subsequent amendments that 
eventually banned their production altogether.  
 
Negotiation of these treaties was informed by a scientific advisory body, the 
Ozone Trends Panel. All of the main features of the ozone regime were 
subsequently imported into the architecture of the climate change regime. 
These included: the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (opened 
for signature at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992); the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, 
agreeing to the adoption of emissions reduction targets for developed 
countries; and the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
 
37 E. A. Parson, Protecting the Ozone Layer: Science and Strategy (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2003). 
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Change to advise the negotiating parties about the science and policy 
options. 
 
ii) The US EPA Acid Rain Programme 
 
In 1993, the US EPA Acid Rain Programme established a cap-and-trade 
programme to enable electric utilities to trade sulphur dioxide emissions 
permits as part of a national policy to reduce acid precipitation. The 
immediate goal of the policy was to allow generators on the eastern 
seaboard to continue to burn high-sulphur coal rather than go to the 
expense of transporting low-sulphur coal from the west.38 The idea was to 
optimise the efficiency of the overall acid rain reduction effort by allowing 
cuts in sulphur emissions to be made where they were cheapest.  
 
The USA brought this experience to bear, against strong initial resistance 
from European countries, in negotiating the Kyoto Protocol, which explicitly 
set out to establish an international greenhouse gas-trading framework. In 
addition to establishing the principle of economic efficiency at the centre of 
the climate regime, this approach to greenhouse gas emissions reinforced 
the leading necessity of monitoring and verification suggested by the 
analogy with the elimination of CFCs. 
 
iii) The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) 
 
The third available precedent for the climate regime was the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty (START), negotiated between the USA and the USSR 
between 1982 and 1991.39 The influence of these negotiations on the design 
of the climate regime came through the professional and cultural 
experiences of key players, including Al Gore (who, as a senator, was at 
least as well known for his engagement in national security issues as his 
commitment to environmental causes) and his principal security policy 
advisor, Leon Fuerth, who went on to advise Senator and Vice-President 
Gore on environmental matters.  
 
In addition to these two, many of the diplomats in senior executive positions 
at the time of Rio had professional experience in superpower relations, in 
which nuclear and latterly conventional arms control had been central and, 
seen from the perspective of 1992, successful. Furthermore, the habit of 
“worst case analysis” employed in the military strategic assessment of risks 
was a formed instrument that seemed well suited to other kinds of low 
probability/high impact risks.40
 
38 D. Burtraw & K. Palmer, “The Paparazzi Take a Look at a Living Legend: The SO2 Cap and 
Trade Programme for Power Plants in the USA”, Resource for the Future discussion paper, 
(15 March 2003). 
39 G.Prins, The Heart of War: On Power, Conflict & Obligation in the 21st Century, 
(Routledge, London, 2001) 22-23. 
40 See G. Prins with R. Stamp, Top Guns and Toxic Whales: The Environment and Global 
Security, (Earthscan/Chelsea Green, London & New York, 1991); “Top Guns and Toxic 
Whales”, (Producer: R. Stamp), Central TV/The Better World Society/The Carter Center/ 
Television for the Environment co-production, Viewpoint 91 (30 April 1991), ITV. 
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The START precedent was a strong incentive for the use of the idea of 
targets and timetables in the cause of mutually verifiable reductions. After 
all, against all expectations, it had worked in the deep freeze of the later 
Cold War. Of course, it presumed technically competent and politically 
motivated actors. But it offered an inviting template: nuclear warheads as 
the metric in the case of START, and units of greenhouse gases in the 
climate regime. Make that substitution and perhaps a repertoire of proven 
summit-based diplomacy could be tapped?  
 
However, the analogy stops there. Although it may have been tough to 
negotiate, nuclear arms reduction was a relatively simple problem in 
comparison with that presented by climate change. There were only two 
countries involved in START. Their focus was a single technology, directly 
under government control. There was no obvious conflict between arms 
reduction and broader economic and development goals; and finally, use of 
the technology was basically unthinkable. Nuclear arms reduction was tame; 
but climate change is wicked.  
 
Superficial Similarities and Serious Differences 
 
Alerted by the alarmed discovery of climate change as a central political 
issue at Rio, a response was constructed mainly from approximate analogies 
and under the deliberate pressures of summitry. Together, the stratospheric 
ozone regime, US EPA Acid Rain Program and START provided elements from 
which the architecture of the climate regime was constructed. The regime’s 
foundation, analogous to the Vienna Convention in the ozone regime, is the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) agreed at the 1992 Rio 
Earth Summit. The Kyoto Protocol was intended to be the counterpart of the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.  
 
But the design of the FCCC and Kyoto has locked the world into a framing of 
the climate change challenge based on plausible analogies that have the 
painful dual characteristics of being superficially proximate but structurally 
misleading on deeper inspection. Ozone depletion, acid rain and nuclear 
arms control were all complicated problems, but compared to climate 
change they were relatively simple to solve. We can examine these 
differences in more detail, by listing, and then examining, the beliefs that 
these analogies produced: 
 
Emissions mitigation is a global commons problem, requiring consensus 
among 168 countries: This is a belief influenced by the ozone regime 
analogy. At the time, a few dissenting voices pointed out that as few as ten 
political units (counting the European states as a single entity) really 
mattered in determining the future of the climate, and that these included 
India and China, who were to be exempted under the proposed regime.41 
However, these voices went unheard in the diplomatic enthusiasm to 
 
41 See for example, Global Environmental Change, Special Issue on National Case Studies of 
Institutional Capabilities to Implement Greenhouse Gas Reductions, 3/2 (March 1993). 
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establish a universal treaty engaging all the world’s governments, which had 
the ring of idealistic symmetry too, matching global threat with universal 
response.  
 
International emissions trading should be the main policy vehicle to deal 
with climate change: This is consistent with the focus on emissions and the 
inclusion of both large and small emitters. For trading to occur, some 
parties must have “spare” emissions to trade. We have already begun to 
illustrate the weird and wasteful ways in which notional credits have been 
fabricated and traded and give more examples below. On the other hand, as 
any decision theorist knows, the more parties to any negotiation, the lower 
the common denominator for agreement will fall.  
 
In the climate regime, this has been demonstrated by the continual process 
of watering down even the very modest commitments of the Kyoto Protocol 
(for “Annex B” countries, i.e., the OECD members and some others, to 
reduce their 1990 levels of CO2 by 5.2% between 2008-2012), such that even 
those of developed countries are now only in the region of 2% and are 
unlikely to be met in any case.42  
 
Climate change is a discrete problem that can be solved independently of 
broader development imperatives: This seems peculiarly ironic given the 
fact that the FCCC was promulgated at the Rio Summit on Environment and 
Development. However, powerful governments have consistently acted to 
keep the issues of climate and development apart. So too, for different 
reasons, have the environmental and development-focussed NGOs.  
 
Despite the inclusion of chapters on sustainable development in the Third 
and Fourth Assessment Reports of IPCC Working Group III, both China and 
the USA resisted calls for an IPCC Special Report on climate and 
development. China seems to have been motivated by concerns that its 
current development trajectory might be altered by such a linkage. The USA 
has also been concerned about possible adverse impacts on its economic 
competitiveness. While these concerns are understandable, it seems 
unrealistic that climate change can be dealt with as a stand-alone issue. 
Furthermore, as others have pointed out, the relationship between climate 
and sustainable development is asymmetrical. In principle, it may be 
possible to deal with climate change in ways that prove unsustainable for 
other reasons. However, achieving a sustainable development trajectory, by 
definition, must include a sustainable solution to the challenge of climate 
change.  
 
Climate change policy is a problem of international co-operation and co-
ordination: Of course co-operation was a necessary feature of the ozone 
regime and of START, both of which involved specific changes in a limited 
range of technologies that could be achieved through government command 
and control. However, it is unlikely that the range and scale of technological 
 
42 E. Pianin, “Emissions Treaty Softens Kyoto Targets”, Washington Post, (29 July, 2001).  
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changes required to achieve climate stabilization can be achieved by 
governments setting comparable targets and timetables for greenhouse gas 
emissions reductions.  
 
Historically, there simply is no precedent for the co-operative, top-down 
creation of an international market of the sort that is envisaged for carbon 
by the architects of the climate regime. On past performance, it is more 
likely that radical technological change will be achieved by genuine 
international competition once there is a firm consensus that national 
security is at stake. After all, competition led to the stockpile of American 
and Soviet warheads in the first place. The competition will come not only 
from nations trying to protect themselves against climate impacts, but also 
from pursuit of profit deriving from more efficient energy production. It will 
also be greatly to the West’s geostrategic advantage when it can reduce 
dependence on oil and gas supplies held by autocratic regimes. But there 
this analogy ends too. 
 
Increasing scientific consensus will drive actors to converge on a single 
policy pathway: We have already argued that, from the very beginning, 
climate policy-making has been made more difficult by the idea that the 
science points to only one possible course of policy action, which prioritises 
radical emissions reductions by the developed countries. Refusal to study 
alternative policy pathways in response to climate change has seriously, in 
our view, contributed to the attractiveness of the conspiracy theorists and 
scientific naysayers to decision makers who reflexively resist being told that 
they have only one course of action available to them. 
 
Missed Lessons 
 
What is perhaps even more disappointing is that not only can we see the 
limitations of the lessons that were drawn for tackling climate change, but, 
with hindsight, we may also note the lessons that could have been drawn 
but were not. 
 
Acid rain was caused by a single activity in a single industrial sector and 
emissions’ trading was limited to a single gas in a single legal system. 
Sulphur dioxide trading was a response to a highly specific issue of coal 
transportation costs. Like the US Acid Rain Programme, the stratospheric 
ozone regime dealt with a very much more limited range of gases than is 
included in the climate regime. Ozone depletion could be prevented by 
controlling emissions of a small suite of artificial gases, for which technical 
substitutes could be found.  
 
Furthermore, CFCs were produced by only a few multinational corporations 
in a handful of countries, making their regulation by governments much less 
problematic. Vitally different too was the fact that manufacturers were 
confident of being able to produce substitutes by the time the regime came 
into being. It is quite the opposite of the logic of the climate regime. The 
conclusive visual evidence of the Antarctic ozone hole—those annual 
sequences of images that showed the hole growing year by year like a 
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malignant growth in an X-ray cross-section of someone’s spine—soon 
cemented public support for strengthening the reduction and subsequent 
phase-out of CFC production.  
 
In the US Acid Rain Program, the initial allocation of SO2 permits was limited 
in number and they were allocated by auction. In contrast, the EU ETS 
permitted participating governments to issue unlimited free permits. 
European governments did what governments seeking popular approval 
always do, namely look after their own national interests. They therefore 
issued permits to European industry to the value of more than the then 
estimated total European carbon emission. The market unsurprisingly blew 
out. There were many guilty parties. But the worst culprit was the Italian 
government, which showered this free subsidy onto Italian industry on a 
heroic scale (close to the total estimate for all of Europe). The carbon price 
crashed from over 30 Euros/ton to 20 cents in the spring of 2006.  
 
The Acid Rain Programme was based on legally enforceable contracts under 
a single national authority. Parties could not walk away from obligations 
with impunity, whereas legal threats, especially to state parties, in 
international contexts (including the EU) are not enforceable effectively or 
at all, as Dutch voters bitterly noticed in French and German flouting of the 
Stability and Growth Pact that was supposed to underlie the single currency. 
The relationships of institutions with property rights are always a sensitive 
issue, deeply woven into the nature of the social contract, and in his 2001 
critique, David Victor argued that the inability of international law to 
provide adequate certainty in a common trading regime is a central reason 
for Kyoto’s failure.43  
 
In particular, the ozone regime is interesting for another reason. There was 
a concerted effort by several countries including the USA and the 
Scandinavians to enact a protocol banning the use of CFC propellants in 
aerosol spray cans at the same time as the Vienna Convention. The move 
was defeated by opposition from the European Community. As a result there 
was a two-year period of cross-national activity at the sub-governmental 
level by environmental, scientific, business, and other groups to build a 
popular consensus around the dangers of CFCs.  
 
Many participants and observers became subsequently convinced that the 
ensuing protocol agreed at Montreal was much more rigorous than would 
have been agreed in the same time frame had the aerosol ban been 
achieved at Vienna. So by this reasoning, might we be further along with 
controlling climate change had the Kyoto Protocol not been rescued at the 
last minute by the intervention of Vice-President Gore?  
 
It is our view that the climate policy track that governments have been 
pursuing for the past fifteen years is a case of negative learning. Negative 
learning is in some ways worse than an admission of ignorance, because it 
 
43 Victor, The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol, xii-xiii. 
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means that—often because of premature foreclosure, adopted in the ways 
earlier described—political capital and practical energy is expended trying 
to map the solution of a wicked problem onto an inappropriate or 
unworkable template. In this light, we read what one of the principal 
architects of carbon trading wrote of the collapse of European emissions 
trading with a heavy heart: ETS was “…always intended as a precursor to the 
real thing—the first official commitment period, under Kyoto, of 2008-2012. 
Getting that right is what really matters.”44 But how hopeful can we be? 
 
Learning from Failure 
 
“The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal 
instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. 
Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow 
ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food 
production is not threatened and to enable economic development to 
proceed in a sustainable manner.”  
Article 2 of the Kyoto Protocol 
 
Initial mis-stating of any complex problem is not a reason for criticism. It is 
the failure to change when the evidence changes that deserves 
condemnation. At the time of the Earth Summit, CO2 was named as the 
problem and reducing fossil fuel use was seen to be the answer. Now we 
know from evolving evidence that this was a seriously inadequate 
formulation. In some ways, notably the suppression of discussion of 
adaptation to climate change, it has been positively perverse. But the 
regime has not been revised in line with that developing and changing 
insight. Indeed, by its nature and because of the politics of its framing and 
adoption, it could not be.  
 
In fact, as Article 2 of the Kyoto Protocol, quoted above, demonstrates, the 
FCCC and Kyoto Protocol have narrowed the perspectives of both 
policymakers and the media-sensitised public, locking them into a tunnel-
vision view of the ramified and imperfectly understood complexities of 
climate change. The British government’s national Climate Change Bill 
(which is presented with much pride as a “world first”) repeats the same 
simple assumption as Kyoto about the primacy of output targets. The overt 
concentration upon greenhouse gases and their mitigation in the convention 
 
44 M. Grubb, “Emissions Impossible: The World's Carbon Market is About to Collapse, But 
Never Mind: the Whole Thing Needs Restructuring Anyway”, Guardian online, (15 May 
2006), 
http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/michael_grubb/2006/05/emissions_impossible.html, 
(accessed 3 November, 2007). 
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has obscured other important and potentially potent instruments of climate 
policy. 45  
 
Although apparently important information may be amassed—and there is 
now a vast literature on climate science and endless analyses of emissions 
reduction policy proposals—an inappropriate framing of the problem can 
lead science, followed by policy, down a blind alley. In fact, the sheer 
volume of knowledge production can be self-reinforcing to the point that 
reassessment of the starting assumptions becomes almost impossible to 
contemplate. The investment has been too great to feel able to discard it; 
and there is no incentive to do so because unlike economic theory, where it 
is rational to walk away from sunk costs, in politics, these represent 
political capital. 
 
Although the rational thing to do in the face of a bad investment is to cut 
your losses, get out, and try something different, there are many obstacles 
that may prevent this, ranging from administrative inconvenience, to 
psychological and emotional barriers. It is difficult to abandon profound 
investments not just of capital, but also of effort and conviction, or of 
reputation and status. Therefore, as well as it being administratively 
inconvenient, politicians and diplomats who have invested much personal 
effort and conviction in creating the Kyoto regime may simply find it 
psychologically and emotionally impossible to walk away from an 
entrenched community of understanding and action to which they feel that 
they belong and that belongs to them. Meeting inside the special bubble and 
breathing the rarefied air of international summitry reinforces both sorts of 
feelings. 
 
The anthropologist Mary Douglas reminded us that one of the ways in which 
institutions help to confer identity on participating individuals is through 
granting them membership of “thought communities”. That is, as well as 
the one well-known transactional strand, that binds members of institutions 
together (e.g., individual utility maximisation), there is another: “…the 
under-represented case, is the role of cognition in forming the social 
bond…the individual demand for order and coherence and control of 
uncertainty.”46 She gave the helpful insight that in understanding the 
tenacity of an institutional group (such as the Kyoto proponents), we require 
this “double stranded” view of social behaviour. The force of belonging to a 
“thought community”, one that helps us make sense of the world around us, 
is one to be reckoned with. It helps to explain how we find ourselves 
 
45 House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee Seventh Report, “Beyond Stern: From 
the Climate Change Programme Review to the Draft Climate Change Bill”, (HC Paper (2006-
7) no. 460) 2007, warns the government (¶ 38) more generally against the dangers of 
“optimism bias” which, the Committee suggests, consistently underestimates the task and 
overestimates the efficacy of legislation’s potential. 
46 M. Douglas, How Institutions Think, (Syracuse University Press, NY, 1986) 19. If Adam 
Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments is read alongside the more famous Wealth of Nations, 
it can be seen that he was aware of the same interplay between material and cognitive 
needs. 
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wearing the Wrong Trousers and marching to destinations not of our 
conscious choosing.  
 
This insight helps to explain why we refuse to learn. If the imprisoning 
powers of the cognitive ties that bind a thought community are as strong as 
Douglas suggested, then it helps to explain why institutional responses to 
failure are notorious for demanding more of what is not working. The 
solution to its failure proposed by those who have promoted and defended 
Kyoto so far is an expanded regime with more demanding targets and 
stricter enforcement. This saves face because it avoids admitting to 
structure and design flaws or—more deeply embedded—the anguish of doubt 
in the face of uncertainty.  
 
These are formidable forces that keep us wearing the Wrong Trousers. How 
can they be discarded? One familiar way is to wait for irrefutable evidence 
of failure, thereby letting circumstance take decisions. That was the 
position of the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York and other bankers in 1929. They realised the effects of the heady 
atmosphere of speculation; they saw the approaching prospect of the Great 
Crash written in the mechanism of allowing investors to purchase stock on 
margin (i.e., on the security of the assumption of a future rise in value and 
yield of the very stock being bought, with little or no independent 
collateral).  
 
“The real choice was between an immediate and deliberately engineered 
collapse and a more serious disaster later on,” wrote John Kenneth 
Galbraith of the situation. The bankers themselves knew this. Yet they did 
not want to take the rap, and the Federal Reserve dared not curb the 
overextension of the many local banks who were engaged in this crazy 
lending, for fear of bringing on the crisis. Gradual deflation of expectation is 
hard to do. So the Fed stared at the approaching slump poised and 
motionless, like a mongoose facing a cobra, while right until the last 
moment, the public fiction that all was well was maintained.47  
 
Galbraith tartly observed that gradual deflation of the speculative bubble 
might have been achieved with a little skill and some moral courage, 
neither of which was present in sufficient quality, in his low opinion of the 
bankers of the day. The current volatile dynamics in the politics of climate 
change suggest to us that an historical analogy with the period just before 
the Great Crash is not misplaced—but does it help us understand how to 
resolve it? 
 
Another example suggests a way. The kind of behaviour we have been 
describing in situations of stress has been most fully studied in trying to 
understand why military commanders facing disaster refuse to accept advice 
that could save them. During World War II, Lt. Gen. Percival led the armies 
of the British Empire during the Battle of Malaya and the subsequent Battle 
 
47 J. K. Galbraith, The Great Crash 1929, (Penguin 1987 [Hamish Hamilton, London 1955]) 
49, 52. 
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of Singapore, surrendering to the Imperial Japanese Army on 15 February 
1942. Percival had refused to prepare Singapore’s northern defences against 
the approaching Japanese on the grounds that to do so “might damage 
morale” by implying that defeat was possible. He was not moved by his 
despairing Chief Engineer Brigadier Simson telling him that being over-run 
might be even more damaging to morale than preparing a defence in time. 
He did not even respond to a directive from Churchill to prepare the 
northern defences. If he had been able to accept that he was wrong and had 
followed the detailed advice of his Chief Engineer in December 1941, 
Singapore might have resisted long enough to give time for reinforcements 
from Australia to arrive.  
 
In fact, Professor Dixon suggests, the reasons for Percival’s failure was 
really transferred anxiety about his own morale: to erect defences meant 
admitting the danger in which he stood by virtue of having grossly misjudged 
the enemy and having taken the wrong steps to that point.48 Therefore he 
was impervious to unpalatable information and persisted doggedly in his 
chosen course until it was too late.  
 
These two analogies suggest that in situations like this, rational argument is 
simply not enough to change people’s minds—we are dealing with problems 
that are profoundly involved with individual and institutional values and 
emotions. If radical change is to be achieved, we will need a radical 
approach. In the final section we suggest what the Right Trousers might look 
like, and how to put them on. 
 
48 N. Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, (Jonathan Cape, London, 1976) 
133-44, 152-3.  
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III. The Right Trousers 
 
Leading with the Wrong Type of Knowledge 
 
Although it has failed to produce its intended impact nevertheless the Kyoto 
Protocol has performed an important role. That role has been allegorical. 
Kyoto has permitted different groups to tell different stories about 
themselves to themselves and to others, often in superficially scientific 
language. But, as we are increasingly coming to understand, it is often not 
questions about science that are at stake in these discussions. The culturally 
potent idiom of the dispassionate scientific narrative is being employed to 
fight culture wars over competing social and ethical values.49 Nor is that to 
be seen as a defect. Of course choices between competing values are not 
made by relying upon scientific knowledge alone. What is wrong is to 
pretend that they are.  
 
A hot debate about contested social and ethical values is thus being cloaked 
in terms of a systematic assessment of scientific information.50 In reality, 
the climate debate is a contest over what values are going to shape global 
society into the future. Daniel Sarewitz has written on the perils of 
“scientizing” debates about values.51 In such a proxy political debate, if 
care is not taken, the scientist may trade on the authority which is 
conferred by the prestige of science in pursuit of political ends. If taken to 
an extreme, this may threaten the legitimacy of science in the layman’s 
eyes. If the public comes eventually to the view that scientists have lent 
their status to over-heated statements in support of a political cause no 
matter how right and proper, it could contribute significantly to a rupture in 
public trust and hence to a further period of “quiescence” in the Downs’ 
Cycle.  
 
Choosing climate change policy is not a technical optimising problem, but a 
matter calling for the exercise of strategic judgement. A matter of 
judgement cannot be settled simply by applying a set of rules. A wicked 
problem cannot be resolved by amassing and then analysing mountains of 
data. Something further is required. 
 
We have been arguing that we have made the wrong cognitive choices in our 
attempts to define the problem of climate change. Although it may 
comprise some straightforward, tame problems of applied science and 
 
49 M. Thompson & S. Rayner, “Cultural Discourses”, in S. Rayner & E.L. Malone (eds.), 
Human Choice and Climate Change: An International Assessment Volume I, The Societal 
Framework (Battelle Press, Columbus, Ohio 1998). 
50 Pielke Jr, The Honest Broker, 40-44,; 70-74.  
51 D. Sarewitz, “How Science Makes Environmental Controversies Worse”, Environmental 
Science and Policy, 7 (2004) 385-403. 
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diplomacy, it is essentially a wicked problem. Strategic judgement in such 
circumstances places a premium upon understanding what we don’t know.52  
 
This guards us from the over-confidence of premature foreclosure and of 
premature certainty in asserted knowledge. It thereby protects us from 
negative learning. It permits us to accept unpalatable information about the 
failure of the Kyoto experiment with fortitude and to learn from its mistakes 
so that scientific knowledge does not run amok in the future. By choosing 
and using the appropriate form of knowledge for the particular aspect of the 
climate change issue, the territories of scientific forms of knowledge can 
thereafter be staked more modestly, safely and hence productively.  
 
Seven Principles by Which to Design and Put on the Right Trousers 
 
There can be no silver bullet—in this case the top-down creation of a global 
carbon market—to bring about the desired climate policy end. But could 
there be silver buckshot? Could we assemble a portfolio of approaches that 
would move us in the right direction, even though we cannot predict which 
specific ones might stimulate the necessary fundamental change? If so, what 
would such a portfolio look like? We believe that a radical rethink of climate 
policy should possess at least seven central elements. 
 
1. Use Silver Buckshot 
 
We have argued that the difference between tame and wicked problems is 
central to understanding why Kyoto has failed. The climate change regime 
has been, so far, modelled on processes used to resolve tame problems. But 
climate change is a wicked problem, the result of complex global systems of 
natural forces interacting with interrelated and interdependent human 
behaviours that have evolved over centuries.  
 
The challenge of reconfiguring the interactions of these systems is difficult 
enough. To do it in time to meet the FCCC objective of avoiding dangerous 
interference with the climate is tremendous. The claim that it can be 
achieved in a couple of decades, through the top-down creation of an 
artificial global market in greenhouse gases seems extraordinary. Bear in 
mind that, as we observed at the outset, since the agreement of the FCCC 
at Rio, global carbon emissions have continued to rise inexorably, while 
national emissions targets have been repeatedly watered down, both 
directly and through “offset” credits (many of a dubious nature).  
In the case of climate change this would mean adopting a wide variety of 
climate policies—silver buckshot—and non-climate policies with climate 
effects. Each would have the potential to tackle some part of the overall 
problem, although it would not be clear which would be the most 
successful, let alone the most economically efficient.53  
 
52 Anthropologists are especially tuned to the dangers that can come from attempts to over-
determine fragile data. See, J. Vansina, in “The Power of Systematic Doubt in Historical 
Enquiry”, History in Africa, 1 (1974) 139-72. 
53 Ibid. 
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This approach is based on an analogy with market forces. It is well known 
that the chance of markets working is increased by chopping up the problem 
because there needs to be some proximity between cost and benefit for 
markets to be energised. One reason why the global trading schemes are 
unattractive is because the costs are borne now and the benefits are in an 
indeterminate future. Chopped into parts, cost and benefit are brought into 
closer proximity, allowing the hidden hand of the market to emerge through 
real price signal fluctuations.  
 
Rather than putting all our eggs into one policy basket made in Kyoto, a 
more viable climate regime would consist of a series of policies intended to 
build resilience against climate turbulence into all the day-to-day 
dimensions of society. These need not be primarily, or even solely, directed 
at climate stabilisation. Instead they would be intended to achieve that goal 
through the accumulation of contingent benefits. They would be aimed to 
work in the world as it is, rather than being predicated upon changing the 
world first so that it fits the policy.54  
 
This oblique and clumsy engagement with climate change is more likely to 
succeed than renewing the same costly and futile frontal assault. There are 
three leading reasons why. First, our approach is not a fragile monoculture. 
It allows a thousand flowers to bloom. It is therefore both more robust and 
more likely to avoid failure, and it commands legitimacy: it meets Adam 
Smith’s design guidance for viable social change. Secondly, it leverages 
existing powerful forces. Finally, it offers a different process with which to 
engage for those who have become institutionally and emotionally wedded 
to the Kyoto Protocol’s flawed assumptions, through their intimate 
entanglement in the minutiae of its proliferating bureaucratic 
superstructure. It provides a golden bridge across which to withdraw from 
Kyoto with dignity. 
 
2. Abandon Universalism  
 
Realism tells us that come what may, there will be a formal political and 
diplomatic process to do with climate change. The next meeting is 
scheduled to happen in Indonesia in December. So what shape should it 
have? The evidence suggests that the assumption that an inclusive global 
treaty is required to curb the growth in greenhouse gas emissions is 
questionable. Relying on an international agreement that requires the 
consent of all national governments inevitably results in the very lowest of 
common denominators. Since fewer than twenty countries account for 80% 
of the world’s emissions and therefore have the potential to make any 
serious contribution to their mitigation, it would be better for diplomacy to 
focus upon them. In these early stages, the other 150 countries only get in 
the way. 
 
 
54 S. Rayner & E. L. Malone, “Zen and the Art of Climate Maintenance”, Nature, 390 (27 
November 1995) 332-335. 
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The British presidency of the G8 in 2005 saw some movement in this 
direction with the launch of the Gleneagles Dialogue on Climate Change, 
Clean Energy and Sustainable Development at the Gleneagles Summit. The 
core of The Gleneagles Dialogue is the G8 countries plus China, India, Brazil, 
Mexico and South Africa, constituting the so-called G8+5. The additional 
participants are Indonesia, Australia, Spain, Poland, Nigeria, South Korea, 
the European Commission and key international organisations including the 
World Bank and the International Energy Agency.  
 
The Dialogue provides a vehicle for participants to discuss innovative ideas 
and new measures to tackle climate change, outside the formal negotiations 
of the FCCC. It is due to report back to the G8 during the Japanese 
Presidency in 2008. However, the Dialogue has yet to emerge as a leading 
alternative to the universalism of Kyoto. Although President Bush’s support 
may not be the most helpful of assets internationally in the declining 
months of his presidency, the conference of the main emitting nations that 
his administration held in September 2007 is a move in the same direction as 
G8+5, and is therefore also to be welcomed. It was therefore diplomatically 
unfortunate that John Ashton, the British diplomat overseeing climate 
policy, appeared to take satisfaction in his public remarks in describing the 
“isolation” of the USA at the September 2007 Washington discussions. Mr 
Ashton’s assumption that this is eccentric to the main line of advance is, on 
the evidence of this essay, misguided. America will be, as it always has 
been, of indispensable centrality to taking real action on climate change. 
 
3. Devise Trading Schemes from the Bottom Up 
 
There are those who object to trading schemes on principle: some regard 
trading schemes as licences to pollute. Revealingly, Kyoto credits have been 
likened to the selling of indulgences by the Roman Catholic Church during 
the sixteenth century, which actually offered their buyers full or partial 
remission of temporal punishment of sins already forgiven, but has often 
been misunderstood as a mechanism offering absolution from future sin. 
 
In contrast, we believe that cap and trade schemes, can contribute one 
useful approach, if, like all genuine markets, they are built from the bottom 
up. The cap part of cap-and-trade can be a sensible Keynesian corrective to 
market failure. The cap shapes the market by signalling the social goal as 
simply as possibly: in this case, the priority of reducing anthropogenic 
impact on the environment. The market does the rest. As with all such 
arrangements, the danger comes when the regulator or legislator succumbs 
to the temptation to meddle too much. Picking winners through subsidies 
for specific technologies, for example in “renewable” energy production, is 
usually a step too far, failing to produce the desired outcome, and bringing 
profiteers flocking. One problem with the Kyoto approach is that those 
involved in its design and operation have succumbed to the temptation to 
meddle with it, at various different levels, simultaneously. This is not 
necessarily badly intentioned: but they have tried to make Kyoto do too 
much, too soon, and without the necessary institutional arrangements to 
enforce contracts among parties who are not bound by other strong ties.  
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The current carbon trading arrangements are particularly flawed by their 
proponents’ refusal to learn from their mistakes, and their refusal to 
acknowledge the structural flaws and practical limitations of the idea as 
they have elaborated it within highly constrained fabricated markets. 
Because the commodity is notional and a political artefact, hostage to 
electoral changes, the price, which is inherently artificial and arbitrary, is 
too volatile to give investors the confidence necessary to drive material 
investment decisions.  
 
Secondly, existing schemes like that used for trading SO2 have all operated 
within nations, where, as we earlier observed, property rights are 
enforceable. That gives reality and stability to the price structure, whereas 
global CO2 emissions trading creates new property rights of uncertain value 
that are treated quite differently in liberal and illiberal regimes. Thirdly, 
compliance is very difficult to monitor. Nations can cheat, as they did in 
issuing emissions permits in Europe; and nobody has yet, even at national 
level, implemented emissions trading for mobile sources. David Victor and 
colleagues have correctly observed that global institutions are simply too 
weak to monitor and enforce what is, in effect, a new monetary system.55 
Even within a single jurisdiction, despite some brave words about the 
lessons learned, the British national pilot experiment in carbon trading was 
hardly deemed a success by the National Audit Office. 56  
 
There is a recurrent theme in understanding the technical failure of the 
Kyoto mechanism: that is, the failure to articulate power properly with 
property via enforceable legal regimes. Under Kyoto, the signatories would 
have little recourse if a nation, having sold its surplus emissions allocations, 
subsequently exceeded its emissions, (probably claiming development 
imperatives). This necessarily undermines the trading basis of Kyoto, since 
markets develop dependably only where there is a stable expectation that 
deals will be kept and property rights respected. There is no reason to 
suppose that emissions markets are any different. We are therefore 
sympathetic to David Victor’s so-called “Madisonian” approach, because, as 
he and his colleagues write in reply to criticism from those who believe in 
more strongly defined caps than they or we do, “For Madison, coordination 
through a relatively weak center was a matter of constitutional design; for 
the international system it is a necessity.”57  
 
Building national or regional emissions markets from the bottom up would 
also provide opportunities for learning from different approaches. 
Eventually such fragmented markets could, and would, become linked until 
such time as global trading is achieved. This is how all real and enduring 
markets have developed historically. There simply is no precedent for 
 
55 D. Victor, J. House & S. Joy, “A Madisonian Approach to Climate Policy”, Science, 
309/5742, (16 September 2005) 1820-21. 
56 National Audit Office, “The UK Emissions Trading Scheme: A New Way to Combat Climate 
Change”, (HC 517 Session 2003-2—4: 21 April 2004.  
57 Victor et al., “Letters”, Science, 311/5759, (20 January 2006) 335-6. 
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successful imposition of an international market by fiat from the top down. 
The failure of the EU ETS gives the force of the market a bad name. 
 
Moreover, the current structure and scope of the Kyoto Protocol make it 
ripe for abuse and exploitation. Although its targets were not ambitious 
enough to be meaningful, the creators of Kyoto were over-ambitious when 
they included all sources and sinks of carbon, as well as of a basket of 
diverse gases including, in addition to CO2, methane, CFCs, and HFCs. The 
extraordinary case of HFCs will serve to illustrate this as a cautionary tale 
about how not to proceed.58
 
A kilogram of trifluoromethane (HFC-23) is equivalent to about 12,000 kilos 
of CO2 in greenhouse effect. It occurs mainly as a by-product of the 
production of the refrigerant HCFC-22, which is being phased out under the 
Montreal Protocol. It can be destroyed by combustion of the flue gases of 
HCFC plants in a scrubber. As a by-product of Teflon production, DuPont has 
done so for no charge for many years. It is a well understood and relatively 
cheap process. But the manufacturers of the refrigerant HCFC 22 can claim 
credits (and money) for doing this under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean 
Development Mechanism. They have done so with a vengeance.  
 
They show that far from paying for clean development in the Poor World, as 
intended, the Kyoto CDM mechanism has become a money machine, 
especially in Asia and especially for HFC capture, which accounts for almost 
two-thirds of all CDM payments for the period to 2012. Brazil, China, India 
and South Korea receive 80% of all payments under the CDM. China alone 
receives half of the total, especially from a huge HCFC plant at Quzhou. 
Carbon-trading lawyer Michael Wara has calculated that HCFC 
manufacturers can earn almost twice as much from Kyoto CDM credits for 
scrubbing HFC-23 as they can from selling refrigerants. Wara further 
estimates that the actual annual cost of HFC abatement is $31m for which 
producers would be paid $800m under the CDM, which is a tempting margin 
for any entrepreneur.59 Most of this production is located in China, which 
then taxes such enterprises at 65%. So western purchasers pay through the 
nose to producers and also pay the Chinese state up to $1.5bn per year in 
Bradsher’s estimate. That revenue is not hypothecated to carbon-reducing 
activities. It goes into Chinese general revenues.  
 
Not only does it seem perverse (not to say grotesque) that polluters can 
make a handsome profit merely from producing and then cleaning up their 
own pollution, but Michael Wara warns that the scale of profits to be gained 
from eliminating HFC-23 has actually helped expand HCFC production in 
developing countries. So Kyoto CDM could slow the phase-out of HCFCs 
under the terms of the stratospheric ozone regime.  
 
58 The story is told in detail in K. Bradsher, “Outsize Profits, and Questions, in Effort to Cut 
Warming Gases”, New York Times, (21 December 2006),           
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/21/business/21pollute.html?ex=1324357200&en=3cc7d8
f20bf8a449&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss (accessed 3 November, 2007). 
59 M. Wara, “Is the Global Carbon Market Working?”, Nature, 445 (8 February 2007) 595. 
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The UNFCCC claims that the HFC-23 option will be closed for CDM credits.60 
But if the scam wasn’t being done with HFCs it would be something else. As 
structured at present, the principal incentive in the Kyoto-type trading 
regime is for specialist firms of lawyers and traders, working for and with 
producer countries and entrepreneurs to search out and exploit such dodgy 
opportunities with huge margins, in order to make money. It does not lead 
to development, clean or otherwise, in the poorest countries.  
 
4. Deal with Problems at the Lowest Possible Levels of Decision- making 
 
Climate change is a multi-level governance problem. Some commentators 
recognized early on that it is not just, or even primarily, a matter for 
negotiation among nation states, but nation states themselves have been 
slow to recognize this. 61 In 2000, Rayner participated in briefing a European 
environment minister on US climate policy, and pointed out that while there 
was little expectation that the federal government would make climate a 
policy priority, there were many opportunities at the state and local 
government levels as well as with the philanthropic and private sectors.62 
However, the minister was clearly not able to relate to the idea of climate 
policy making at these levels.  
 
A clear object lesson in the actual nature of American democracy was 
provided by the State of California in 2006, which is that the states do not 
rely on the federal government to dictate policy, and that citizen initiative 
really can change policy from the grass-roots. We hope that more European 
politicians can overcome their condescension about America and understand 
that even in the absence of federal legislation on issues concerned with 
product standards, any standard established by California and Massachusetts 
effectively becomes the de facto standard for the whole country.  
 
5) Invest in Technology R&D 
 
The rhetoric about the threat of global climate change is not matched by 
political or private actions. We stare at stark divergences of trends. On the 
one hand, the International Energy Agency predicts that in the next twenty-
five years, the global demand for energy will double. On the other, since 
 
60 See http://environment.newscientist.com/article/dn1115-kyoto-protocol-loophole-has-
cost-6-billion.htm (accessed 3 November 2007). 
61 L. P. Gerlach & S. Rayner.,“Culture and the Common Management of Global Risks”, 
Practicing Anthropology, 10/3 (1988) 15-18; S. Rayner,  “A Cultural Perspective on the 
Structure and Implementation of Global Environmental Agreements”, Evaluation Review, 
15/1 (1991) 75-102; T. O’Riordan, et al. “Institutional Frameworks for Political Action”, in 
Rayner & Malone (eds.), Human Choice and Climate Change Vol 1 (1998). 
62 For descriptins of such programmes, see B. Rabe, Statehouse and Greenhouse: The 
Emerging Politics of American Climate Policy (Brookings Insitution Press, Washington DC. 
2004); H. Bulkley & M. Betsill, Cities and Climate Change: Urban Sustainability and Global 
Environmental Governance (Routledge, Abingdon, 2004). 
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1980, government budgets for energy R&D have reduced, worldwide, by 
40%.63  
 
This disinvestment in R&D could hardly have happened at a less opportune 
time for the pursuit of climate change goals. Much of the electricity- 
generating capacity in the industrialized world is nearing the end of its 
useful life and will need to be replaced in the next three decades. Europe 
alone will need to replace over 200,000 megawatts of capacity by 2020. 
“Negawatts”, from improving insulation and end-use, can reduce the total 
demands, but only fairly slowly, as building stock is renewed. Without 
significant new investment in energy R&D, the technologies upon which any 
emissions reduction strategy depends simply will not be available at a 
competitive cost at the time when they could make a significant difference. 
It is not a case of having to start from scratch, either: many of these 
technologies already exist; they just need the investment to take them to 
the production levels that would make them economically competitive. And 
that investment is needed soon, because with no alternative base-load 
generating technology (apart from nuclear), the worn-out electricity-
generating plants will simply be replaced by new carbon-intensive 
generating capacity, with another fifty year life-span. 
 
As well as interrupting this replacement cycle, such an investment could 
accelerate the move away from fossil fuels more rapidly than all the targets 
and timetables, if energy use patterns follow the trajectory of the energy 
intensity index that country after country has demonstrated during the 
history of industrialisation since the mid-eighteenth century. As each 
successive country—Britain, Germany, France, America, Japan—passed over 
the top of the curve from increasing utilisation of energy per unit of 
production to decreasing utilisation per unit, it did so at a lower absolute 
peak.  
 
Ironically, given the way that climate activists have sought to demonise air 
travel, aero-engine and aircraft technology improvements over the last few 
decades are a leading example of the incremental efficiency gains from 
technological innovation in response to market demand. The huge increase 
in air travel over the last twenty years (9% p.a.) has not been tracked by an 
equivalent rise in fuel use. It has instead seen a far lower rate of increase in 
the annual CO2 burden from the sector. The IPCC writes that “…the trend in 
fuel efficiency of jet aircraft over time has been one of almost continuous 
improvement; fuel burned per seat in today's new aircraft is 70% less than 
that of early jets. About 40% of the improvement has come from engine 
efficiency improvements and 30% from airframe efficiency improvements”.64
 
 
63 Rayner, “The International Challenge of Climate Change”, 6-7. 
64 Section 9.2.2, “Developments in Technology”, in Chapter 9, “Aircraft Emissions: Current 
Inventories and Future Scenarios”, in J. Penner, et al., Aviation and the Global Atmosphere 
(IPCC, 1999). See http://www.grida.no/climate /ipcc/aviation/133.htm#922 (accessed 3 
November, 2007). 
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In the meantime, for base-load power in the industrial world, which is by its 
nature far less elastic in response to new priorities than transport sectors, 
we will be driven to use stop-gaps. Nuclear fission will be pre-eminent. Over 
60% of all energy R&D undertaken around the world during the past forty 
years has been spent on developing nuclear power. That was an 
opportunity/cost choice against other investments in large scale 
renewables, notably ocean kinetic (wave power capture; ocean current 
turbines etc.) and solar sources. But given that these other renewable 
resources are still not scaled up and mature, nuclear remains part of an 
interim solution: the alternatives are now brown-outs and power cuts.  
 
The recent experience of Cape Town in this respect is a small-scale object 
lesson of what we expect to happen more widely in coming years. Rapid 
increase in demand as electrification was extended into the townships after 
1994, and a failure by Eskom, the utility company, to expand base-load 
power to match, led the previously reliable supply to the city to become 
vulnerable. It grew increasingly unstable in 2005-6, when the Koeberg 
nuclear power complex experienced a series of technical failures which 
caused shut-downs. In response, power was expensively routed across the 
Karoo from the huge and dirty coal-fired stations of the East Rand. Now, 
new nuclear capacity from a Pebble Bed Modular reactor will be provided at 
Koeberg, despite considerable local environmentalist opposition. We expect 
new nuclear build to occur elsewhere in similar fashion, even in the absence 
of a permanent solution to the nuclear waste issue.  
 
Another stop-gap technology is carbon capture and storage, which could be 
used to buy time for an effective transition away from intensive use of fossil 
carbon for energy. Removing carbon from oil and gas at the well-head is one 
way of producing hydrogen for use in fuel cells or for burning in engines. CO2 
can also be removed from the flue gases of fossil power plants, enabling 
continued use of coal and oil. In both cases, the scrubbed CO2 can be 
injected in spent oil and gas wells using modified technologies that already 
exist for oil and gas extraction. 
 
A step further would be to capture CO2 directly from the air. 65 So far, the 
investments in this sector have been meagre, but the insurance value of 
such investments could be quite substantial. A couple of large 
demonstration plants—notably one in China being co-funded by Europeans—
are in prospect. But if removal of CO2 from the atmosphere is really 
regarded as an over-riding requirement, then ultimately research and 
development on the direct capture of carbon from ambient air could, and 
should, be scaled up. In fact, currently, discussion of this technology and 
other forms of so-called geo-engineering is taboo (because it would mean 
that climate change no longer had force as an argument for changing life-
styles and promoting voluntary frugality in many areas of consumption).  
 
 
65 D. W. Keith, M. Ha-Duong, and J. K. Stolaroff, “Climate Strategy with CO2 Capture from 
the Air”, Climatic Change, 74 (2006) 17-45. 
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These are all areas of “tame” knowledge that will respond reliably to 
Manhattan Project-style infusions of investment that hitherto have not been 
made. However, none of these radical new developments can occur in an 
accelerated time-scale under the price signals that even a well functioning 
cap-and-trade is likely to send in the foreseeable future. In the final 
analysis, cap-and-trade cannot deliver the escape velocity required to get 
investment in technological innovation into orbit, in time. That calls for 
something else. 
 
So an internationally competitive programme of energy modernization is 
urgently required. This is a cause that embraces the political spectrum. In 
his book Earth in the Balance, Al Gore called for what he called a “Strategic 
Environment Initiative” focussed on just such issues, as part of his vision for 
a “Global Marshall Plan”.66 The American Enterprise Institute also supports 
primary research on sustainable new energy technologies. In 2006, the 
President of the Royal Society67, echoing the suggestions made by US 
researchers in 199868, argued that it should be kick-started with public 
funds in public research facilities like NASA or the US National Laboratories 
by a new Apollo program or new Manhattan Project of research into new 
and/or highly improved energy technologies. A mere 6% of the world’s 
energy R&D budget has been used to support renewable energy. Since only 
ten countries carry out 98% of the world’s energy research, a concerted 
programme of new investment in renewable energy along the lines proposed 
in 2006 by Lord Rees is plausible. 
 
The wartime comparison in Lord Rees’s proposal is intentional and welcome. 
It does not signal the search for a new enemy: it does register the urgency 
and the priority that this issue should command. It seems reasonable enough 
to expect the world’s leading economies and emitters to devote as much 
money to this challenge as they currently spend on military research—in the 
case of the USA, about $80 billion per year. That would seem to be a more 
promising route to decarbonisation of the global energy system than the 
current approach of 2% co-operative targets that show no prospect of being 
met, combined with market-distorting and complicated cross subsidies from 
the successful to the unsuccessful via the sale of notional credits.  
 
In principle, this sort of R&D scale-up could be achieved without any need 
for international—let alone global—treaties, as the government policies that 
are needed mainly consist of domestic programmes, ideally yielding open 
source results, to induce firms to invest in renewable energy.  
 
Some limited forms of international agreement would probably be necessary 
to help speed the transfer of advanced, low-emitting technologies to less 
industrialized countries so that they can avoid following the carbon 
 
66  A. Gore, Earth in the Balance, 319-34. 
67 M. Rees, “The G8 on Energy: Too Little, Too Late”, Science, 313/5787, (4 August 2006) 
591.  
68 M. I. Hoffert, K. Caldera and A. K. Jain, et al. “Energy Implications of Future Stability of 
Atmospheric CO2 Content”, Nature 395 (29 October, 1998) 881-884. 
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intensive development path. This would be the route to engaging India and 
China. Such arrangements would be far less problematic than full 
implementation of the Kyoto architecture and could be accommodated 
within, for example, existing international development channels. The 
elaboration of these arrangements would be a useful centrepiece for the 
agenda of the Indonesian Summit. The Bush Administration’s Asia-Pacific 
initiative on technology transfer has the defect of focusing only upon that 
aspect of the matter, but its obvious virtue is that it does at least that and 
is congruent with the wider set of actions that we advocate. So, with 
political will and a leading focus upon infusing the market with competitive 
development and application of de-carbonised energy technology, there 
could be a rapprochement between the American and the UN initiatives. 
 
6. Increase Spending on Adaptation  
 
The particular casualty of the Kyoto approach that we most regret has been 
the failure to exploit the capacity of anticipatory adaptation to deal with 
the consequences of climate change.  
 
Adaptation has, until very recently, received little attention beyond the 
provision for unspecified co-operation in Article 4.1(e).69 This is a pity.  
Adaptation has consistently been the poor and derided cousin of emissions 
reduction in the history of the climate regime. For the best part of a 
decade, even discussion of adaptation was regarded by most participants in 
climate policy making as tantamount to betrayal.70 Even though it was 
widely recognized by the end of the 1980s that the by then existing stock of 
atmospheric greenhouse gases was likely to have already established a 
warming commitment, the policy community suppressed discussion of 
adaptation out of fear that it would blunt the arguments for greenhouse gas 
mitigation. At the time of writing, the (still unmet) commitment of 
international resources to the multilateral Adaptation Fund is derived in 
part from a tax on the Clean Development Mechanism and is $1.5bn. Funds 
for mitigation come from many sources and total at least $19 bn.71 We 
believe that global adaptation efforts need to be funded at comparable 
scales to those we advocate for investment in technology R&D. 
 
69 All parties shall “Cooperate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate 
change; develop and elaborate appropriate and integrated plans for coastal zone 
management, water resources and agriculture, and for the protection and rehabilitation of 
areas, particularly in Africa, affected by drought and desertification, as well as floods.” 
70 . Thompson & S. Rayner, “Cultural Discourses”.  M
71 “An investment framework for clean energy & development: A progress report”, V-P for 
Sustainable Development, The World Bank, 1 September 2006, DC2006-0012(E). For 
mitigation, the relevant funds include (source: IETA)  The BioCarbon Fund; The Community 
Development Carbon Fund (CDCF); The Danish Carbon Fund; The Italian Carbon Fund; The 
Multilateral Carbon Credit Fund (MCCF);  The Netherlands Carbon Facility (INCaF); The 
Netherlands CDM Facility (CAF); The Netherlands European Carbon Facility (NECaF); The 
Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF); The Spanish Carbon Fund; Netherlands EBRD fund; EBRD 
multilateral carbon credit fund (MCCF). 
See http://carbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=Funds&ItemID=24670 (accessed 3 
November, 2007). We are indebted to Dr N Hultman for assistance in assembling these 
figures. 
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In June 2007, the Commission of the European Union published as a Green 
Paper its first policy document on adapting to the impacts of climate 
change.72 In its technical annex the Paper is somewhat predictive in its 
approach and it is not clear to what extent the authors still visualise 
adaptation filling gaps left by the inadequacies of mitigation (the line found 
in the Stern report), given that the European Climate Change Programme 
gives a central priority to deep cuts in emissions; but the fact of recognition 
of some salience of adaptation is welcome. It is timely that this occurs in 
the window of opportunity before the next framework for climate policy is 
fully locked in.  
 
While it may seem obvious to climate activists that preventing growth in 
greenhouse gas concentrations is a logical priority over adapting to climate 
impacts, this is not a self-evident truth because of the difference between 
the stock and the flow of greenhouse gases. Current emissions reductions 
(flow) will mainly benefit future generations because of the momentum 
(stock) already built up in the climate system. So, faced with the effects of 
present stock, adaptation has a naturally faster response time, a closer 
coupling with innovation and incentive structures and thereby confers more 
protection more quickly to more people. It also stimulates new 
technologies, new services and new markets for them to inhabit as a natural 
contingent benefit. Nor is it clear to us that the overwhelming priority that 
the climate regime has accorded to emissions reduction would be shared by 
the millions of poor people currently dependent on marginal ecosystems, 
were they to be consulted. For these populations, the early lock-in to 
narrowly defining climate change as a problem of establishing emissions 
reduction targets and timetables, and the failure to date to have unlocked 
the issue from that rigid frame, is likely to be a literally fatal error.73
 
Adaptation measures avoid climate impacts by changing human behaviours, 
such as land use, and by taking actions to protect valued resources, 
communities, and landscapes. Adaptation encompasses a wide range of 
options that can reduce vulnerability of marginal human and natural 
populations to the consequences of atmospheric disturbance. Many 
(although admittedly not all) adaptation measures also offer increased 
resilience in the face of climatic variability (such as droughts and storms), 
which makes them potentially attractive policies even in the absence of 
long-term secular changes in climate. “No regrets” steps are the first to 
take, since they will be good to have done even if current concerns over 
climate change turn out to have been exaggerated.74 If sea ice will be gone 
in thirty-five years, as some project, it will be gone; and insofar as that is a 
consequence of anthropogenic climate change, there is nothing that action 
 
72 EU Commission “Adapting to Climate Change in Europe: Options for EU Action”, (2007), 
COM/2007/0354. 
73 R. Pielke, G. Prins, S. Rayner & D. Sarewitz, “Lifting the Taboo on Adaptation”, Nature, 
445 (8 February 2007) 597-8. 
74 Verweij, Douglas, et al., “Clumsy Solutions for a Complex World: The Case of Climate 
Change”, Public Administration, 84/4 (2006) 817-843; Pielke, Jr. The Honest Broker, 73-4. 
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between now and then can do to change that. Adaptation to change, alone, 
has relevance in this time-scale.  
 
From the point of view of public policy implementation, adaptation may 
have some other useful advantages over policies directed at mitigation. 
Adaptation engages people with the fate of objects and landscapes that are 
known to them and valued by them in their daily lives and it offers them 
ways to preserve them while saving money. The opinion polling data that 
shows consistent unwillingness to curtail travel and life-style in the interests 
of emissions reductions supports this as a political strategy. Thus adaptation 
policies may provide the only realistic opportunities for a wide variety of 
people to become directly and positively engaged with the climate issue.  
 
Moreover, the basic regulatory and legal concepts and frameworks already 
exist (e.g., governance of land use) and are broadly accepted; they just 
need to be adapted. This is not to minimize the political challenge, but we 
are not starting from scratch. This is in marked contrast with the challenge 
of mobilising public support and action to cut emissions. Emissions are too 
abstract and too easily seen as someone else’s problem to be a good starting 
point from which to mobilize support for climate policies. And “green” taxes 
are widely seen as a cost and a con.75 However, once people have mobilized 
around concrete adaptation goals and experienced positive benefits, they 
may be more likely to move to support emissions reductions measures that 
seem implausible at present.76
 
Another considerable advantage of increasing the focus on impacts and 
adaptation is that action in these areas does not require any kind of global 
consensus. Indeed, as impacts and the potential for adaptation vary widely 
on a regional basis, it seems quite likely that that such an emphasis would 
favour regional responses. There would almost certainly be many and varied 
opportunities for the articulation of climate policies with other policies 
designed to improve public health and protect populations from natural 
disasters.  
  
7. Understand That Successful Climate Policy Does Not Necessarily Focus 
Instrumentally on the Climate 
 
We offer a different lesson from the city of Kyoto. It comes not from a 
passing caravan of international diplomacy that once visited there but from 
a more grounded source: from Zen Buddhism. The approach to Kinkakuji, 
Kyoto’s famous Buddhist Golden Temple, in the north-west of the city, 
deliberately depresses expectations. The visitor is therefore unprepared for 
the splendour of the temple, and the impact of its shimmering form across 
 
75 63% of those polled in an August 2007 YouGov study of British attitudes to taxation 
believed that “green” taxes were proposed by politicians as a stealthy way to raise general 
taxes. See 
http://www.yougov.com/ archives/pdf/toplines%20tax.xls.pdf (accessed 3 November, 
2007). 
76  Rayner & Malone, “Zen and the Art of Climate Maintenance”, 333. 
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the water that surrounds it being all the greater. That moment of 
unexpected discovery means that the memory of the beauty of Kinkakuji 
will live long in the mind. This is one example of a principle found across 
Zen architecture which tends to favour restraint—glimpses rather than 
panoramas—to evoke a more powerful effect: As Christopher Alexander and 
his colleagues put it, “The view of the distant sea is so restrained that it 
stays alive forever.” 77  
 
Sometimes the best line of approach is not head-on, if one seeks long-lasting 
impact. This is not only a Japanese insight: “Lose the object and draw nigh 
obliquely” is a dictum attributed to the famous eighteenth century English 
landscape gardener Lancelot “Capability” Brown.78 The landscapes that he 
created on that principle were a visual reminder of the differences between 
England and the Continent. 
 
Aristocratic European gardens of the period followed the same architecture 
of brute power evinced by palaces like Versailles, or its northern and even 
more intimidating cousin, the Catherine Palace at Tsarske Selo, near St 
Petersburg. There the travel-stained ambassador approaches the Presence 
through a hundred yards of formal reception rooms, dripping with Baroque 
sculpture, shimmering with faïence and velvet. Double door after double 
door swings closed behind him, and the Presence remains constantly in 
view, along the die-straight sightline. That sort of conditioning experience 
was designed to awe the visitor, and was also apparent in the design of 
gardens and grounds. The chateau was framed by the castle gates and then 
approached directly, along a tree-lined boulevard, ensuring that the visitor 
was fully aware of the wealth and power of the owner, so literally in your 
face, before the butler opened the front doors.  
 
In contrast, Brown’s designs framed the stately home at the entrance, but 
only briefly. After allowing the visitor a glimpse of his destination, the 
driveway would veer away to pass circuitously and delightfully through 
woodland vistas, through broad meadows with carefully staged aperçus of 
waterfalls and temples, across imposing bridges spanning dammed streams 
and lakes, before delivering the visitor in a relaxed and amused frame of 
mind, unexpectedly, right in front of the house. The message of the design 
was subtle: no need to rub the wealth of the house and its owner in a 
visitor’s face when you can use it to engage and entertain. There are 
 
77 Pattern no. 134, “Zen view” in C. Alexander, S. Ishikawa & M. Silverstein, A Pattern 
Language: Towns, Buildings, Construction (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1977) 642-43; 
Rayner & Malone, “Zen and the Art of Climate Maintenance”. 
78 Brown (1716-83) left no treatises, only landscapes. But the spirit of the dictum was in 
common currency in writing on landscape and good taste. In Epistle IV to the Earl of 
Burlington (December 1731), Alexander Pope, wrote: “Let not each beauty ev’rywhere be 
spied/When half the skill is decently to hide./He gains all points, who pleasingly 
confounds,/ Surprises, varies, and conceals the bounds.” But the clearest statement of the 
rationale that Brown translated into his designs comes from Shenstone: “When a building or 
other object has been once viewed from its proper point, the foot should never travel to it 
by the same path, which the eye has travelled over before. Lose the object, and draw nigh, 
obliquely”, William Shenstone, Unconnected Thoughts on Gardening (1764). 
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different ways of expressing power, some of which are more likely to gain 
the compliance of others. Capability Brown might be a useful mentor for 
climate policy designers.  
 
At the moment, there is a tendency for politicians and bureaucrats to do 
just the opposite. They invoke climate protection in raucous support of 
particular policies and practices, many of which have only a tenuous 
connection to effective climate change responses. The public is lectured on 
many aspects of its life and pleasures in censorious tones, and then told to 
save the planet.  
 
The attempt to develop clumsy solutions does not depend on coordinated 
action. It focuses on social learning. Individuals and countries alike would 
pick and choose the policy measures that suit their particular 
circumstances. Ironically, this was an approach that was being pursued prior 
to the emergence of the FCCC/Kyoto regime.79  
 
The mix of instruments within an oblique approach could range from 
informational signals, such as labelling, through market instruments, such as 
emissions trading, to command and control mechanisms, such as technology 
standards. The benefit of this approach is that it focuses on what 
governments, firms, and households actually do to reduce their emissions, in 
marked contrast to the target setting that has characterized international 
policy making since the Toronto Conference of 1988. Since the exact 
consequences of any particular package of policy measures would be 
uncertain, governments would focus less on targets and more on navigation: 
maintaining course and speed.  
 
In Conclusion 
 
The flexibility of our silver buckshot approach, emphasising technology 
investment and adaptation, would allow early policy interventions to serve 
as a series of policy experiments, from which lessons could be drawn about 
what works, when and where. Cooperation, competition, and control could 
all be brought to bear on the problem as appropriate. A particular 
advantage of this approach is that it allows for switching strategy. Policy 
actors (not just governments) would have the ability to abandon courses of 
action that are not working, and transfer their efforts to those that might, 
by responding to price signals in genuine markets for example, and without 
the ponderous necessity of renegotiating an entire international regime. 
 
For some governments and politicians it may be difficult to admit to their 
citizens that there are things that they cannot do as well as other agents: at 
first sight, this hardly seems a compelling claim to leadership. It shrinks 
their case. For others, the sense of loss of control could be problematic. 
Monitoring and verifying the actions of other nations would be a 
 
79 For example, see US Department of Energy, A Compendium of Options for Government 
Policy to Encourage Private Sector Responses to Potential Climate Change. Report to the 
Congress of the United States (1989). 
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considerable challenge, but part of the benefit of this approach is that by 
spreading responsibility widely, it places less emphasis on the nation state 
and encourages transnational collaborations among firms, trade 
associations, local governments, nongovernmental organizations, scientific 
and technical organizations, and so forth. An approach of learning-by-doing 
may not be an elegant one. However, among its advantages is the fact that 
it does not provide perverse incentives for firms or countries to hold back 
from emissions reductions in the expectation that such reductions may have 
a future value that will be lost if they actually take action today. 
 
Looking for and promoting climate benefits from actions taken for other 
reasons may really be a sustainable and fruitful approach. It applies most 
easily and directly to action that furthers adaptation to climate change; but 
it is also perfectly applicable to steps that further its mitigation. We have 
argued above that a virtuous circle of benefit can be initiated from the one 
to the other. The essential principle which animates that circle, enlightened 
self-interest, was stated long ago: “We address ourselves not to their 
humanity but to their self-love and never talk to them of our own 
necessities but of their advantages.” 
 
That principle expresses a fundamental belief that the proper purpose of 
politics is to do things for people, not to them. Such politics open doors and 
liberate energies in ways that build legitimacy through willing consent. They 
focus upon setting strategic goals; they abjure detailed meddling. We have 
argued here that if we radically rethink climate policy along these lines, an 
efficient role for public policy in respect of wicked problems like climate 
security will therefore be mainly indirect. It is, as we have explained, only a 
superficial paradox that the oblique approach is more likely to succeed than 
a frontal attack via summits, treaties and intergovernmental planning 
processes that try to set output targets, to pick winning strategies without 
benefit of experiment and to prescribe social behaviour in detail. It is for 
the reasons that both Zen architecture and Capability Brown help us to 
understand. In the first two parts of this essay, we explained in detail how 
and why we have come to be trapped in the Wrong Trousers of the Kyoto 
Protocol approach to climate security, and with what unwelcome 
consequences. In the last third, we have therefore set down the handful of 
well tried guiding principles that have the benefit of a past record of 
success: the Right Trousers.  
 
Now is the moment to swap trousers. If the Bali Conference can become the 
occasion when the principles of an oblique and clumsy approach supplant 
the obsolescent approach which gave us the Kyoto Protocol that has 
dominated climate policy so fruitlessly for the past fifteen years, we believe 
that there are then strong grounds for hope. That hope is of two sorts. The 
first is hope that the Prometheus of humanity’s ingenuity and intellectual 
energy can be swiftly unbound from the rock of Kyoto to begin to break the 
link between the fossil-fuel energy nexus and world-wide wealth creation, 
which alone can restore harmony between the twin goals of climate security 
and human development. The second hope is that we may avoid the 
otherwise looming possibility of a collapse of public support for any forms of 
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action on climate policy when the current spinning of the failure of Kyoto as 
success fractures irrevocably before the eyes of the concerned public. So 
this essay has been a conscious contribution to a controlled collapse of 
expectation, since the other alternative is to let events take their course, as 
bankers did in the Great Crash of 1929.  Passivity before such a prospect is 
neither courageous nor wise. 
 
And the fate of Wallace’s Wrong Trousers? The criminal penguin Feathers 
McGraw attempts to make Wallace, locked into the Techno Trousers, an 
unwilling accomplice in the theft of a diamond from the local Museum. 
Thanks largely to Wallace’s resourceful dog, Gromit, he does not succeed, 
and “Feathers” ends up behind bars. After his traumatic experiences, 
Wallace realises that the Trousers are not the valuable addition to his 
lifestyle that he had originally expected. They are not a convenient and lazy 
way for him to exercise the dog. So the last scene of the film shows the 
Techno Trousers striding off alone into the sunset. 
 
 
